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ABSTRACT
Since Buckley v. Valeo was decided in 1976, a series of decisions claiming to rest upon its foundations have
eroded the campaign finance framework that it erected, culminating in the Citizens United decision and its
progeny, SpeechNow.org. During the same period, campaign financing has been transformed by the
skyrocketing cost of campaigns, innovative campaign practices, rapid increases in the amount of money injected
into elections by business interests, an increasingly small number of high-wealth individuals accounting for an
increasingly large percentage of campaign spending, and a trend toward employing dark-money campaign vehicles
and adopting other strategies to evade campaign finance disclosure rules.
Many critics of Citizens United believe that the real villain is Buckley and, thus, that there is no way to
undermine Citizens United without overturning Buckley. This Article rejects that understanding and the
assumption upon which it is based: that Citizens United faithfully adhered to Buckley in reaching its holdings
about corporate political speech. It argues instead that Citizens United can be invalidated based upon
Buckley’s own doctrines and reasoning and, moreover, that were the original Buckley Court to review Citizens
United (a thought experiment this Article calls “Buckley 2.0”), it would overturn the later case.
Buckley 2.0 would re-assess Citizens United based upon its own understanding of the original Buckley’s
principles and reasoning and in light of empirical evidence derived from contemporary campaign practices. It
would also demonstrate the ways Citizens United disregarded the explicit teachings of other precedents it claimed
to follow. The result is a more faithful reading of the original Buckley and subsequent campaign finance cases,
coupled with a more honest recognition of campaign financing realities that threaten the integrity of representative
government in America.
The immediate result of Buckley 2.0’s analysis would be to restore the provision of federal campaign finance
law requiring corporations to use money raised by their political action committees (“PACs”) to fund independent
expenditures. The Article demonstrates that invalidating Citizens United would leave business interests the
ability to raise enormous sums of money to finance their campaign spending and to engage in issue advocacy.
Thus, Buckley 2.0’s rejection of Citizens United would leave business interests able to communicate their
views widely and effectively to the public using a combination of regulated and unregulated funds.
A more far-reaching consequence of Buckley 2.0’s invalidation of Citizens United would be to invalidate the
holding of SpeechNow.org, which relied on reasoning from Citizens United to hold that individuals and
groups can give unlimited amounts of money to organizations that engage in independent campaign spending. The
amount of money raised by such vehicles since 2010 has been immense, has profoundly altered the financing of
contemporary campaigns, and has reduced transparency in campaign financing. Thus, by rejecting Citizens
United, and thereby undermining SpeechNow.org, Buckley 2.0 would roll back some of the worst excesses
of contemporary campaign-finance law and practice.
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INTRODUCTION
If you read Supreme Court campaign finance cases, you will be struck by
the disconnect between the lofty rhetoric used to justify the constitutional
protections political speech is afforded and the impoverished sound bites and
hyperbolic attack ads that dominate contemporary electoral
communications. The origin of this disconnect is in large part two
phenomena. First, in the last decade the Court has failed to take the factual
record seriously and, as a result, has made generalizations that are belied by
contemporary campaign practices. Second, it has misrepresented the
content of several election law precedents so as to claim consistency with
decisions at odds with its rulings. As a result, the Court has created an
alternative universe that only First Amendment absolutists find credible, and
it has constitutionalized an increasingly corrupt electoral landscape.
All campaign finance cases rely, in varying degrees, on Buckley v. Valeo,1
the first Supreme Court decision to evaluate the constitutionality of the
Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), enacted in 1971.2 Citizens United3
relied repeatedly on Buckley to reach its holding that it is unconstitutional to
prevent corporations and unions from using their general business revenues
for campaign spending, assuming that their actions are not coordinated with
candidates and their campaigns.4 As a consequence, many critics of Citizens
United believe that the real villain is the Buckley decision and, thus, that there
is no way to undermine Citizens United without overturning Buckley,
presumably by a constitutional amendment declaring Buckley or its key
doctrines null and void.5
1

2

3
4
5

424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). All the Justices except Justice Stevens, who did not take part in the
decision, joined in the part of the opinion finding that there was a case or controversy. Justices
Brennan, Stewart, and Powell joined the entire opinion, but the remaining four Justices joined in
some parts and concurred or dissented in others.
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 382 (as amended).
The law was originally codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq., but sections in Title 2 of the United States
Code were editorially reclassified in Title 52, Voting and Elections, in the 2014 supplement to the
Code as 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–26. See generally Editorial Reclassification Title 52, United States Code,
OFFICE OF LAW REVISION COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://uscode.
house.gov/editorialreclassification/t52/index.html.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See infra notes 180, 201, 213, 255–56, 262, 262, 279 and accompanying text.
See Ellen L. Weintraub, Overturn Buckley v. Valeo, POLITICO MAG., http://www.politico.com/
interactives/2019/how-to-fix-politics-in-america/corruption/overturn-buckley-valeo (last visited
Apr. 4, 2020); Scott Casleton, It’s Time for Liberals to Get Over Citizens United, VOX (May 7, 2018),
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This Article rejects that understanding and the assumption upon which
it is based, namely, that Citizens United faithfully adhered to Buckley’s
framework in reaching its holdings about corporate political speech. It
argues instead that Citizens United can be invalidated based upon Buckley’s own
doctrines and reasoning and, moreover, that were the original Buckley Court
to review Citizens United, it would overturn the decision itself.
Buckley spoke very forcefully about the importance of political speech for
democratic self-government. Yet the decision did not endorse an absolutist
position for protecting political speech.6 Rather, Buckley can be seen as
striking a balance between the free speech claims of individuals and groups,
on the one hand, with other societal interests, especially the integrity of
elections in a representative democracy, on the other. Although that balance
has been criticized by many, the Supreme Court has so far declined to
overrule the decision explicitly, preferring to modify several of Buckley’s
holdings to provide support for its own groundbreaking decisions.7 As a
result, the balance struck in Buckley between free-speech values and the goal
of election integrity has been lost, and it has been replaced by political speech
absolutism justified in pseudo-Buckley terms.
To draw out the consequences of these developments, this Article
conducts a thought experiment which analyzes how the Buckley Court would
decide Citizens United and its progeny, taking into account its original decision,
precedents relying upon its decision, and the factual and doctrinal changes
that have occurred since it issued its pioneering opinion. This thought

6

7

http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/5/7/17325486/citizens-united-money-politics-dark-m
oney-vouchers-primaries; Derek Cressman, End Court-Ordered Corruption, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 29, 2016),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-01-29/reverse-buckley-v-valeos-40-years-of-cam
paign-finance-damage; BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF OVERTURNING
BUCKLEY V. VALEO, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/buc
kley.pdf (last accessed May 17, 2020).
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (citing U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 413
U.S. 548, 567 (1973), for the proposition that “[n]either the right to associate nor the right to
participate in political activities is absolute”).
The main exception is McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014), which expressly invalidated FECA’s
limit on aggregate contributions during a campaign cycle, despite Buckley’s upholding of that
restriction. See infra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. Criticism of Buckley began with the
decision itself: five of the eight Justices wrote opinions that concurred in part and dissented in part.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 235 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part); id. at 257 (White, J., concurring in
part); id. at 286 (Marshall, J., concurring in part); id. at 290 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part); id.
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part). The most consistent critic of Buckley is Justice Thomas. See
McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 228 (Thomas, J., concurring) (urging that Buckley be overruled and listing
five previous decisions in which he called for it to be overruled).
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experiment is called Buckley 2.0. Part I examines campaign practices at the
time Buckley was decided and today and compares the amounts spent then
and now in constant dollars. Part II moves to the doctrinal plane and
analyzes how Buckley 2.0 would likely respond today to issues Buckley decided
in 1976 or parallel issues arising today, taking into account contemporary
empirical data and campaign finance practices and doctrines developed in
the last decade.
In Part III, Buckley 2.0 considers whether the time has come to overrule
Citizens United.8 It begins by reviewing the basic principles animating the
original Buckley decision. It then examines the reasoning set forward in
Citizens United that Congress has no legitimate interest in restricting the
sources of funds that corporations and unions use to support candidates in
federal elections if these organizations engage in independent spending.
Based upon the analysis in Part II, Buckley 2.0 would conclude that the later
case did not faithfully represent the teachings of the original Buckley. Thus,
it would reject Citizens United’s claim that its reasoning is based upon Buckley.
Re-assessing the validity of Citizens United’s conclusion based upon its own
understanding of the Buckley principles and holdings, and in light of empirical
evidence derived from contemporary campaign practices, Buckley 2.0 would
conclude that unlimited spending by corporations and unions—as well as
unlimited contributions to groups independent in name only—pose a threat
of corruption and the appearance of corruption sufficient to justify
restrictions by Congress on the sources and amounts of certain types of
campaign spending.
The immediate result of Buckley 2.0’s conclusion would be to restore the
provision of federal campaign finance law requiring corporations to use
money raised by their political action committees (“PACs”) to fund campaign
messages that urge the support or defeat of specific candidates for elective
office or their functional equivalent. As the statistics in Part I make clear,
prior to the changes initiated by Citizens United, spending by corporations and
other business interests by means of their own PACs and the PACs of trade
associations to which they contribute had increased more than eight times
over their spending at the time of Buckley, calculated in constant, i.e., inflation
adjusted dollars. Invalidating the holding of Citizens United would thus leave
those interests still able to raise enormous sums of money to finance their
campaign spending, although it would require them to raise the money
8

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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following federal rules governing the funding of PACs. Moreover, business
interests would continue to be able to avail themselves of the issue advocacy
rules to fund without limit messages that omit express advocacy of the
election or defeat of specific candidates. Thus, Buckley 2.0’s rejection of
Citizens United would leave business interests able to communicate their views
widely and effectively to the public using a combination of regulated and
unregulated funds.
A more far-reaching consequence of Buckley 2.0’s invalidation of
Citizens United’s ruling would be to invalidate the holding of SpeechNow.org v.
FEC,9 which relied on the analysis of part of Citizens United to hold that
individuals and groups can give unlimited amounts of money to
organizations that engage in independent spending, whether they are Super
PACs or independent-expenditure exempt organizations, commonly known
as dark money groups. As is shown in Part I, the amount of money raised by
such vehicles since 2010 has been immense, has profoundly altered the
financing of contemporary campaigns, and has further reduced transparency
in campaign financing. Thus, by rejecting Citizens United and thereby
undermining SpeechNow.org, Buckley 2.0 would roll back some of the worst
excesses of contemporary campaign finance law and practice.
I. THE ELECTORAL LANDSCAPE THEN AND NOW
Campaign finance law affects all who participate in the electoral process,
whether as individuals, business entities, or other groups. This Part compares
selected campaign practices at the time Buckley was decided with the most
recent presidential campaign cycle (2015–2016). The goal is to establish the
electoral landscape—the facts on the ground—at the time of Buckley and now,
so that a hypothetical Buckley 2.0 would have an empirical basis for
reassessing its original decision in light of contemporary campaign finance
law and practices.
There is a tendency to blame corporate spending for many of the ills of
the campaign finance system. Those who do this probably mean spending
by business entities or interests in general, rather than corporations per se,
given that much business revenue in the United States is generated by noncorporate entities such as limited liability companies (“LLCs”) and other

9

SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1003 (2010).
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limited liability business vehicles.10 Business interests also contribute money
or make expenditures through trade associations, chambers of commerce,
and other interest groups. The discussion that follows attempts to be precise
about which types of entities are at issue. However, because what
corporations do or fund has traditionally been captured more systematically
than campaign spending by business interests in general, it is often not
possible to compare apples to apples. This is especially true because the
proliferation of types of business entities and outside groups had not yet
blossomed in the 1970s, when Buckley was litigated. Moreover, the disclosure
rules enacted as part of the original FECA legislation did not become
effective until April 1972,11 so data from the last presidential election cycle
before Buckley is incomplete.12
To provide perspective on the discussion that follows: the last presidential
election held prior to the Buckley litigation was in 1972.13 The cost of the
presidential and congressional races combined was $236 million,14 or $1.355
billion in 2016 inflation-adjusted dollars.15 In 2016, the cost of the
presidential and congressional races combined was roughly $6.5 billion,16 or

10

11

12

13
14

15
16

See SOI Tax Stats—Integrated Business Data, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Mar. 5, 2020),
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-integrated-business-data (scroll down to Table 3 and
follow the 2015 hyperlink) (showing, based upon 2015 returns, that traditional “C” corporations
account for 1.6 million of 35 million business returns). “S” corporations file roughly 4.9 million
returns and LLCs and other pass-through entities accounted for 3.7 million returns. Id.
See JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REP. NO. 84-78, POLITICAL ACTION
COMMITTEES: THEIR EVOLUTION, GROWTH AND, IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
55, 64 (1984).
See id. at 63–64 (describing the main private organizations and scholars that collected data before
the FEC began to collect data systematically). A comprehensive empirical study of financing the
presidential and Congressional elections in 1972 is HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE
1972 ELECTION (1976). In general, the present analysis examines presidential elections rather than
off-year elections. The statistics compared include aggregate amounts spent on presidential and
congressional races unless otherwise specified.
The case was heard by the Supreme Court in 1975 and the decision was published January 30,
1976. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, Financing Politics: Money, Elections, and Political Reform 16
(1976). According to Alexander, the presidential contest cost $138 million in 1972, and the
congressional contests combined cost $98 million. Id.
See Inflation Calculator, U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (last
visited Dec. 28, 2019) (showing that the inflation rate was 474.2%).
See Niv M. Sultan, Election 2016: Trump’s Free Media Helped Keep Cost Down But Fewer Donors Provided
More of the Cash, OPENSECRETS (Apr. 13, 2017, 1:10 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/
2017/04/election-2016-trump-fewer-donors-provided-more-of-the-cash (listing spending total as
“nearly $6.5 billion”). Other sources list the total amount spent during the 2015–2016 election
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roughly four-and-a-half times as much as the 1972 federal elections in
constant dollars. Some of the increase may be attributable to a larger
electorate in 2016.17 Yet there have been other developments that could
have reduced the cost of races, such as many fewer swing states18 and
competitive congressional races,19 as well as the use of relatively inexpensive
electronic sources like e-mail and social media to reach potential voters. It
is, then, not clear how much, if any, of the 450% increase in aggregate
election spending can be attributed to the cost of reaching a significantly
larger electorate. Other forces appear to be driving the rapid acceleration of
the cost of federal elections.

17

18

19

differently, ranging from $6–7.5 billion. See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., CONFERENCE BOARD, THE
LANDSCAPE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: CAMPAIGN FINANCE AFTER CITIZENS UNITED 3
(2017), available at https://www.ced.org/pdf/TCB-CED-The-Landscape-of-Campaign-Contribu
tions.pdf (listing total as $7.5 billion).
The voting age population in 1972 was 140,776,000. See Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections 1820–
2012, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, U.C. SANTA BARBARA, http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/statistics/data/voter-turnout-in-presidential-elections (last visited Apr. 4, 2020). In 2016, it
was 250,055,734, an increase of roughly 75%. See 2016 General Election Turnout Rates, U.S.
ELECTION PROJECT, http://www.electproject.org/2016g (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).
See William A. Galston & Pietro S. Nivola, Delineating the Problem, in 1 RED AND BLUE NATION? 14
n.39 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006) (identifying roughly twenty-four competitive
states in the 1976 presidential election and twelve in 2004); STACEY HUNTER HECHT & DAVID
SCHULTZ, PRESIDENTIAL SWING STATES: WHY ONLY TEN MATTER xi-xvi (2015) (recounting the
history and concluding that the concept of a swing state is not precisely defined).
Between 1996 and 2016, the number of competitive districts decreased by over half to merely
seventeen. See Galen Druke, Want Competitive Elections? So Did Arizona. Then the Screaming Started,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 21, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/want-competitiveelections-so-did-arizona-then-the-screaming-started/ (describing how an attempt by the State of
Arizona to dismantle gerrymandering resulted in partisan battle over the best means for creating
competitive districts during the 2011 round of redistricting). According to another source, in
November 2016 there were roughly 395 safe seats in the House, and of the 40 remaining seats, 11
leaned toward one of the parties. See Nathan L. Gonzales, House Ratings, INSIDE ELECTIONS (Nov.
3, 2016, 3:55 PM), http://www.insideelections.com/ratings/house/2016-house-ratingsnovember-3-2016. In the Senate, in 2016, twenty-three out of thirty-four elections that year were
considered safe. See Nathan L. Gonzales, Senate Ratings, INSIDE ELECTIONS (Nov. 3, 2016, 3:56
PM),
http://www.insideelections.com/ratings/senate/2016-senate-ratings-november-3-2016.
The Cook Political Report has roughly the same numbers. See 2016 House Race Ratings, COOK POL.
REP. (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.cookpolitical.com/ratings/house-race-ratings/139359; 2016
Senate Race Ratings, COOK POL. REP. (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.cookpolitical.com/
ratings/senate-race-ratings/139360.
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A. Electoral Spending by Corporations and Other Business Interests
Business spending on federal elections has risen dramatically, assessed in
constant dollars, since 1976, when Buckley was decided.20 Even in areas
where corporations are still restrained by Buckley-era regulations, they now
inject vastly larger sums into federal races.21 In addition, when Buckley was
decided, corporations were limited in their electoral funding and spending
by several campaign finance laws that no longer apply since Citizens United.
The amounts spent by business interests in areas affected by these changes
have similarly risen dramatically.22
1. Spending by Business Interests Where Law Has Not Changed
From 1971 until 2002, corporations were allowed to spend their general
treasury funds (business revenues) on all electoral matters except for expressly
urging the election or defeat of specific candidates (“express advocacy”) or
for making contributions to candidates, their campaigns, and their agents.23
In 2002, Congress amended FECA by enacting the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (“BCRA”),24 which included a provision prohibiting
corporations from using treasury funds for “electioneering communications”
on the eve of a primary or an election.25 Thus, as of 2010, corporations were

20
21
22
23

24
25

Buckley examined the constitutionality of federal campaign law, so this Article is limited to federal
issues, even though state campaign finance developments can affect federal practices.
See Part I.A.1 (examining business contributions and expenditures in areas unchanged by Citizens
United).
See Part I.A.2 (examining business spending in areas changed by Citizens United).
On the many avenues for corporations to fund federal candidates or campaigns before FECA, see
CANTOR, supra note 11, at 28–35. For a history of the legal limits on corporate campaigns spending,
both state and federal, see United States v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aircraft, & Agric. Implement
Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 570–87 (1957) (detailing the historical legal boundaries on corporate
spending in federal elections). This history predates the enactment of FECA, which considers
spending (by individuals or entities) that is coordinated with candidates or their campaigns to be
contributions to them and, therefore, subject to contribution limits. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 46–47 (1976) (per curiam); 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(7)(B));
11 C.F.R. §109.21(b) (2019).
See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
(codified at 52 U.S.C. §30118(b)(2), formerly 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(2)) (amending FECA).
An “electioneering communication” is a communication made using broadcast, satellite, or cable
media, if it is made in the thirty days before a primary or sixty days before an election, refers to a
candidate (by name or other identifying attribute or logo), and can be received by at least 50,000
people in a congressional candidate’s district, a Senate candidate’s state, or, in the case of a
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required to fund contributions to candidates, express advocacy, and
electioneering communications using money raised by their PACs, which are
strictly regulated by the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”).26 Among
other restrictions, corporations can raise funds for their PACs from their
shareholders, executives, or administrative personnel (and the families of
these groups), but not from the general public.227 In addition, the amount
each contributor can give to a corporation’s PAC is capped at $5,000.28
Further, PACs are themselves limited to giving a maximum of $5,000 to each
candidate, although they can also contribute additional amounts to certain
political committees.29 As a rule, these restrictions provided corporations
with a smaller pool of funds and limited them to smaller contributions for the
three types of restricted activities than would have been possible in the
absence of the FECA limits. Unions were similarly limited with respect to
using their PAC funds for contributions and for spending on express
advocacy and electioneering communications.30
As discussed below, in 2010, Citizens United held that corporations can use
their treasury funds on spending that is independent of candidates and

26

27

28

29
30

candidate for President, in the United States. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(f)(3)); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a)–(b) (2019). See also infra notes 118–22 and accompanying text.
52 U.S.C. §30118 (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(4)(A)(i)). FECA does not speak about
PACs, but about “political committees,” which include PACs and other groups involved in federal
elections.
52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(4)(A)(i) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i)). Corporations are
permitted to solicit permitted parties twice a year, by mail to their homes, as long as procedures are
adopted to prevent the corporation from determining who had contributed nothing or less than
fifty dollars. Id. § 30118(b)(4)(B) (formerly 2 U.S.C. §441b(b)(4)(B)). Early research found that most
of the money raised came from high-level personnel. See John R. Mulkern, Edward Handler &
Lawrence Godtfredsen, Corporate PACs as Fundraisers, 23 CAL. MGMT. REV. 49, 51 (1981).
Corporations are permitted to use their business revenues to pay the expenses of administering their
PACs. See 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(C) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C)). This statement was true of
multicandidate PACs only. If a PAC did not give to at least five different candidates and raise
money from fifty people, the maximum contribution to it was $1000. However, most PACs
qualified for the larger contribution. See Frank J. Sorauf, Political Action Committees, in CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 123 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997).
See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(2)(A)–(C) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(2)(A)).
See Id. § 30118(b)(4)(A)(ii) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(4)(A)(ii)) (limiting unions to soliciting
contributions from unions members and their families); Id. § 30118(b)(4)(B) (formerly 2 U.S.C.
§441b(b)(4)(B)) (permitting unions to solicit members twice a year by mail at their homes as long as
procedures are adopted to prevent them from determining who has contributed nothing or less
than $50).
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campaigns.31 This means that corporations can now use general business
revenues for express advocacy and electioneering communications as long as
they do not coordinate with candidates or their campaigns when they engage
in these activities. In contrast, corporations must still make contributions to
candidates for federal office or their campaigns using money from their
PACs. Parallel rules apply to unions.32
Although the same rules govern the funding of corporate PACs and
contributions from them to candidates today as they did when Buckley was
decided, the sums corporate PACs and other business interests raised and
spent at the time the case was decided are very different from what they raise
and spend today. These amounts can be divided into contributions that
PACs make to candidates and other expenditures made by PACs.
Because FECA went into effect only seven months before the 1972
election,33 statistics from 197434 and 1976 provide a better baseline for
comparison with 2015–2016 than would 1972.35 In those two elections,
corporate PAC contributions were $2.4 million and $6.7 million
respectively,36 or $11,680,000 and $28,260,000 in inflation-adjusted dollars.
In the 2016 election cycle, in contrast, corporate PACs gave approximately
31

32
33

34

35

36

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Although the plaintiff in Citizens United was a
nonprofit corporation, the holding applies to all corporations and to unions, as long as they operate
independently of candidates and their campaigns.
See FEC, CAMPAIGN GUIDE: CORPORATIONS AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (2018), available at
https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/colagui.pdf.
Prior to the enactment of FECA, which went into effect in April 1972, corporations had no way to
contribute to candidates. See Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). Since
FECA, they can contribute to candidates using PAC money.
The 1974 election was not a presidential election cycle, but the 1976 election also involved
predominantly House and Senate contributions since the presidential candidates took public
financing.
In 1972, the last presidential election before Buckley, corporate PACs gave at least $1.7 million to
congressional candidates, which would be almost $9.8 million in 2016 dollars. See CANTOR, supra
note 11, at 124. Another source has $3.1 million, but that figure combines “business” and
“professional” contributions. See ALEXANDER, supra note 14, at 214. Professional PACs included
PACs of groups like the American Medical Association (“AMA”). Id. at 32–33, 60. The 1984
Congressional Research Service overview of federal campaign finance laws lists only contributions
to congressional candidates because presidential candidates at that time opted for public financing,
precluding contributions to them by PACs or others, and because PAC contributions to presidential
candidates have historically accounted for less than 5% of their contributions. See CANTOR, supra
note 11, at 64–65.
See CANTOR, supra note 11, at 124. These amounts are somewhat exaggerated because they are
based upon FEC data that combined “corporate” and “business” contributions. See id. at 126 n.2
(explaining the inconsistencies in FEC reporting of “business” and “corporate” contributions).
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$182 million in contributions to all federal candidates,37 or roughly six-anda-half times the inflation-adjusted amount that corporate PACs contributed
in 1976.
Trade associations also represent business interests.38 The category was
not identified as such in 1972 as it is now.39 In 1974 and 1976, “Trade,
Membership, and Health” group PACs contributed $1.8 million and $2.6
million to congressional candidates, respectively,40 which are $8.76 million
and $11 million in inflation-adjusted dollars. In 2015–2016, trade
associations contributed $82.56 million to congressional candidates,41 an
increase of more than seven times those in 1974 and 1976. In addition,
membership and cooperative PACs in 2015–2016 contributed almost $45
million to congressional candidates.42 These comparisons are rough, among
other reasons, because health PACs are not broken out in 2015–2016 and
because not all membership PACs are business oriented, e.g., those of the

37

38

39

40

41

42

See FEC, PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES: JANUARY 1, 2015 THROUGH DECEMBER 31,
2016 (2017), available at https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/pac/PAC2_
2016_24m.pdf. Labor PAC contributions to all federal candidates in 2015–2016 totaled
$46,728,402. Id. The numbers reported on the FEC website are slightly different from those
reported by the Campaign Finance Institute, which applies its own methodology to the raw FEC
statistics. See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONGRESSIONAL
CANDIDATES 1978–2016 (2018), available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/HistoricalTables
/pdf/CFI_Federal-CF_18_Table2-10.pdf .
See Tie-ting Su, Alan Neustadtl & Dan Clawson, Business and the Conservative Shift: Corporate PAC
Contributions 1976–1986, 76 SOC. SCI. Q. 20, 22 & n.1 (1995) (stating that trade association PAC
contributions are “highly correlated with corporate donations”); CANTOR, supra note 11, at 88 n.2
(stating that trade associations and health care groups are assumed to have “a basically pro-business
orientation.”).
See CANTOR, supra note 11, at 126 & n.2. Another source classifies business, professional,
agricultural, dairy, and health-related groups as “special interest groups,” see ALEXANDER, supra
note 14, at 228, but does not distinguish business and professional when it lists contributions. See id.
at 214. Alexander does list contributions by dairy, education, health-related, and “rural-related,”
which includes electrical and agricultural interests, and contributions by these groups totaled
$3,950,000 in 1972.
See CANTOR, supra note 11, at 125–26, n.3; see also JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
REP. NO. 86-148, CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: A GUIDE TO THE LAW AND
ITS OPERATION 36 (1986) (listing $10 million in “business-related” contributions to candidates,
which included a portion of trade association contributions). But see HERBERT E. ALEXANDER:
MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM 84 (2d ed. 1980) (stating that corporate and
business-related trade associations gave more than $7 million in direct contributions to candidates
that year).
See FEC, PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES: JANUARY 1, 2015 THROUGH DECEMBER 31,
2016 (2017), available at https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/pac/PAC2_201
6_24m.pdf. In 2015–2016, trade associations gave only $213,407 to presidential campaigns. Id.
See id.
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Sierra Club and the National Rifle Association.43 Despite these limitations
in the data, combining inflation-adjusted totals of corporate and trade
association PAC contributions in 1974 ($20 million) and 1976 ($40 million)
with comparable amounts in 2016 ($265 million), business-related PACs in
2016 contributed to candidates between six and ten times what they did
when Buckley was decided, even though the campaign finance rules in this
area have remained unchanged.
The dramatic increase in business-related contributions to candidates for
federal office has been mirrored by other expenditures made by business
interests in federal elections (without taking into account their contributions
to Super PACs and social welfare organizations, which are discussed
below44). Typical examples include independent expenditures, contributions
to state or local candidates, direct mail, contributions to presidential
candidates in primaries, fundraising, and administrative costs.45 According
to the FEC, corporate PACs made roughly $5.8 million in total expenditures
in the 1975–1976 election cycle,46 equal to $24,464,685 in 2016 dollars. In
the 2016 election cycle, in contrast, corporate PACs spent $385,710,026 in
total expenditures on behalf of federal candidates,47 which is more than
fifteen times what they spent in 1975–1976 in constant dollars.

43

44
45

46

47

A better comparison might be that in 1974, business and business-related special interest groups
gave $4.8 million to House and Senate candidates, see ALEXANDER, supra note 14, at 228, or $27.3
million in 2014 dollars, as compared with $257,264,309 in the 2014 House and Senate races. See
Press Release, FEC, Statistical Summary of 24-month Campaign Activity of 2013–2014 Election
Cycle (Apr. 3, 2015), https://www.fec.gov/updates/statistical-summary-of-24-month-campaignactivity-of-the-2013-2014-election-cycle/. Contributions in 2014 were more than nine times the
contributions in 1974 in constant (2014) dollars.
See infra Part I.A.2 (examining business spending in areas changed by Citizens United).
See CANTOR, supra note 11, at 68–70. According to Cantor, independent expenditures were
responsible for an increasing share of PAC spending other than contributions to candidates between
1974 and 1980. Id. at 67.
See Press Release, FEC, FEC Releases Index on Corporate-Related Political Committees (Sept. 18,
1977), https://transition.fec.gov/press/archive/1977/19770918_Index-76PAC.pdf. There is no
separate data for corporate PAC expenditures in 1974; for combined “business related”
expenditures of $8.1 million in 1974, see CANTOR, supra note 11, at 84. Cantor notes that the
numbers are “subject to dispute” because of a lack of consistency in standards for types of business
spending prior to 1978. See id. at 83–84.
See FEC, SUMMARY OF PAC ACTIVITY, JANUARY 1, 2015 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2016 (2017),
available at https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/pac/PAC1_2016_24m.pdf.
During the 1975–1976 election cycle, union PACs spent a total of $17.5 million on federal
candidates. Richard Briffault, Herbert E. Alexander & Elizabeth Drew, The Federal Election Campaign
Act and the 1980 Election, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2087–88 & n.28 (1984). That is $73.8 million
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In addition to direct spending by corporate PACs, business-related trade
association PAC expenditures for congressional candidates in the 1975–1976
election cycle was roughly $5.5 million,48 which would be $23.2 million in
2016 dollars. Trade association PACs spent approximately $65.5 million in
the 2015–2016 cycle on direct spending,49 or almost three times as much in
constant dollars. Given that trade association PAC direct expenditures
combined with those of corporate PACs were $451,210,026 in 2015–2016,50
corporate and business-related PACs spent almost ten times in 2015–2016
what they did in 1975–1976, in constant dollars.
In sum, combining business-related contributions to candidates with
other expenditures, business interests spent $716 million in 2015–2016, as
compared with $87 million in 1975–1976 (in inflation-adjusted dollars), or
eight-and-a-half times more than in the 1976 election cycle. This dramatic
increase does not take into account increased spending by business interests
as a result of the 2010 decision in Citizens United.
2. Business Spending After Changes in the Law
Changes in the Court’s election-law doctrines have accelerated spending
by corporations and other business entities on elections. Since Citizens United
held that corporations can use non-PAC money for independent campaign
spending,51 the amount of corporate expenditures during campaigns has
increased, although it is difficult to track such spending for two reasons. First,
corporations and other business entities are now free to contribute unlimited
amounts to independent expenditure-only groups.
Some of these
organizations are exempt from income tax under the Internal Revenue Code
(“IRC”), are active in political campaigns, and rarely have to disclose or fully

48
49

50
51

in 2016 dollars, compared with total union PAC spending in the 2015–2016 election cycle of $256.9
million, see id., which is roughly three-and-a-half times the 1975–1976 amount in constant dollars.
See ALEXANDER , supra note 40, at 84.
Compare FEC, SUMMARY OF PAC ACTIVITY, JANUARY 1, 2015 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 2016
(2017), available at https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/pac/PAC1_20
16_24m.pdf, with Press Release, FEC, Statistical Summary of 24-Month Campaign Activity of the
2015–2016 Election Cycle (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.fec.gov/updates/statistical-summary-24month-campaign-activity-2015-2016-election-cycle.
The former source states that trade
association contributions in 2015–2016 to candidates for President, House and Senate totaled $82.7
million, while the latter states that total trade association PAC disbursements during that election
were $148.2 million. This leaves $65.5 million for all other trade association PAC spending.
See supra notes 47, 49 and accompanying text.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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disclose their donors.52 For example, until recently, exempt organizations,
like section 501(c)(4) social welfare groups and section 501(c)(6) trade or
business association groups had to list their donors on their IRS information
returns, although this information was not usually disclosed to the public.
Thus, the identities of individual corporate or other business entity donors to
such exempt organizations were not available to the public, but could be
monitored and quantified by the IRS. The IRS changed its disclosure policy
in 2018, so that these exempt organizations no longer have to list their
donors’ identities on their information returns filed with the IRS.53 The
IRS’s new position was widely criticized, among other reasons because the
agency will no longer be able to determine if donors to the organizations are
foreign persons, who are prohibited by law from funding election activities.54
The new policy will also prevent the IRS from easily determining
contributions to such entities by corporations, LLCs, and other business
entities or by labor unions and similar organizations. Although a federal
court subsequently invalidated the IRS action, it did so because the agency
had not followed the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”).55 Because the court did not rule on the merits of its
proposal, the IRS did not appeal the decision and instead proposed the
identical change in a rulemaking allowing for the notice and comment

52

53
54

55

For disclosure, see infra notes 54–72 and accompanying text. The most commonly used exempt
organizations are I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) social welfare groups, I.R.C. § 501(c)(5) labor organizations,
and I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) trade associations and chambers of commerce. For Super PACs, see infra
notes 84–90. Independent-expenditure-only groups are funded with contributions unlimited in
amount from businesses, unions, or individuals as long as the groups operate independently of
candidates, parties, and their campaigns. See infra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
Independent expenditures of any size made by individuals singly have been protected by the
Supreme Court since before Buckley, so they were unaffected by the recent judicial rulings. Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976) (per curiam).
See Rev. Proc. 2018-38, 2018-31 I.R.B. 280.
See Press Release, David E, Price, Member, U.S. House of Representatives, Rep. Price Introduces
Legislation to Overturn Controversial “Dark Money” Rule (Dec. 13, 2018), https://price.house.
gov/newsroom/press-releases/rep-price-introduces-legislation-overturn-controversial-dark-mone
y-rule. One commentator has opined that the IRS’s decision may be an effort to reduce claims that
its actions reflect bias against certain groups. See Philip Hackney, Dark Money Darker? An
Examination of the IRS Choice to End the Collection of Donor Information on Form 990, at 10–
11 (Apr. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript, N.Y.U. Law Nonprofit Forum) (on file with author).
See Bullock v. IRS, 401 F.Supp.3d 1144 (D. Montana 2019); see also IRS, NOTICE 2019-47,
PENALTY RELIEF RELATED TO RELIANCE ON REVENUE PROCEDURE 2018-38 (2019) (providing
that organizations that failed to disclose contributors on Schedule B in reliance on Revenue
Procedure 2018-47 prior to the District Court decision will not be subject to penalties).
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procedures required by the APA.56 Thus, IRS disclosure rules will no longer
enable the agency to determine what different donors contribute based upon
organizations’ annual information returns, although it will retain the ability
to request such information during an audit.
Second, there are FECA disclosure rules imposed on exempt
organizations funding campaign advertising, but as interpreted by the FEC,
these have little or no efficacy. Sections 30104(c)(1) and 30104(c)(2)(C) of
FECA require an entity making independent expenditures greater than $250
to disclose the identity of each person contributing more than $200 made for
the purpose of furthering an independent expenditure and the amount and
date of the contribution.57 However, the FEC promulgated a regulation
under these provisions requiring the disclosure of only contributors who
made donations to fund the specific independent expenditure the entity was
required to report.58 Because of the discrepancy between the statute’s reach
and that of the regulation, a watchdog group sued the FEC and won a
judgment invalidating the regulation.59 In response, the FEC issued a Press
Release stating that, while it appeals the district court decision, it would
require entities (other than political committees) to disclose the identity of
“donors of over $200 making contributions earmarked for political
purposes.”60 By including the qualification “earmarked,” the FEC seems to
have created an enormous loophole. An exempt entity could devote 40% of
its funds to independent expenditures but, unless those who contribute to it
earmark their donations for “political purposes,” the entity could claim that
100% of its contributors would not need to be identified.61

56
57

58
59

60

61

See IRS, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting
Requirements of Exempt Organizations, 84 Fed. Reg. 47447 (Sept. 10, 2019).
See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(1), (2)(C) (2018). This Section incorporates the contents of 52 U.S.C. §
30101(8)(A) (defining a contribution) and 52 U.S.C. § 30104(b)(3)(A) (specifying that the reports
filed must identify certain persons and the date and amount of their contributions).
See 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(e)(i)(vi) (2019).
See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 316 F. Supp. 3d 349 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal
filed sub nom. Crossroads Glob. Policy Strategies v. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash.,
No. 18-5261 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 30, 2018).
See Press Release, FEC, FEC Provides Guidance Following U.S. District Court Decision in Crew v.
FEC (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-provides-guidance-following-us-districtcourt-decision-crew-v-fec-316-f-supp-3d-349-ddc-2018/.
See Brendan Fischer & Maggie Christ, New Reports Show Why the FEC Needs to Clarify Disclosure
Requirements for Dark Money Groups—and Why Congress Should Go Even Further, CAMPAIGN LEGAL
CENTER (Feb. 6, 2019), https://campaignlegal.org/update/new-reports-show-why-fec-needsclarify-disclosure-requirements-dark-money-groups-and-why (describing that, notwithstanding a
D.C. District Court decision, dark money is still largely secretive).
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The situation for electioneering communications is less ambiguous, but
no more transparent. Section 30104(f) of FECA requires an entity funding
more than $10,000 in electioneering communications during a calendar year
to file a report that contains, among other things, the names and addresses
of anyone contributing $1000 or more in aggregate to the entity during that
year.62 Arguably, Congress intended this provision to require reporting of all
contributors of $1000 or more. However, the FEC promulgated a regulation
requiring disclosure of only those who made such contributions “for the
purpose of furthering electioneering communications.”63 This regulation
was upheld by an appellate court that found the agency’s decision was not
only a permissible interpretation of BCRA; it was persuasive as well.64 As a
result, despite FECA’s provisions that would appear to require exempt
organizations active in campaigns to disclose information about their
contributors, such disclosures are easily avoided and occur quite rarely.
The exempt organizations in question may use the money they raise to
fund their own election advertising and other campaign activities.
Alternatively, they can transfer some or all of their money available for
campaign spending65 to Super PACs, which are subject to disclosure rules.
Super PACs are required to reveal the names of individuals and entities that
give directly to them, but in practice the names of entities are frequently
generic, so they do not reveal the ultimate donors to their funds. As a
consequence, the extent of business spending on campaigns that is funneled
through certain exempt organization intermediaries cannot be known.
Similarly, although I.R.C. §527 requires PACs not regulated by FECA to
disclose their donors,66 the disclosures typically reveal only the immediate,
not the ultimate donor. In many instances, then, corporations may be

62
63
64
65

66

See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(2) (2018).
See 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2019). The history of the FEC’s ruling process is detailed in Van Hollen
v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486, 490–91 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
See Van Hollen, 811 F.3d at 493.
Under IRS regulations, exempt organizations must be “primarily” devoted to the purpose and
activities that constitute the mission justifying their exemption from taxation, e.g., social welfare for
section 501(c)(4) groups, employee welfare for section 501(c)(5) labor groups, and business interests
for 501(c)(6) trade associations and related groups. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(I); I.R.S. GEN.
COUNS. MEM. 34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969). The IRS has not published precedential guidance regarding
the meaning of “primarily” in this context. For the IRS’s litigating position with regard to the
primarily standard for 501(c)(4) groups, see Miriam Galston, Vision Service Plan v. U.S.: Implications
for Campaign Activities of 501(c)(4)s, 53 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 165 (2006).
I.R.C. § 527(j)(3)(B). The requirement applies to donations of $200 or more in a calendar year. Id.
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“hiding behind dubious and misleading names,”67 so their political spending
is invisible to the public and impossible to quantify. Further, groups have
devised other stratagems to evade disclosure of donors’ identities.68
In contrast, in the case of trade associations and chambers of commerce,
which are exempt under section 501(c)(6), all their money comes from
business interests.69 Although the donors to these organizations are also not
disclosed to the public or IRS, some of their spending on campaigns can be
captured. In particular, businesses are usually permitted to deduct the cost
of dues to trade associations from their gross income, thereby reducing their
taxable income.70 However, the IRC denies such deductions for costs
incurred for campaigning or lobbying, whether the money is spent directly
by the business entity or through an intermediary, such as a trade association
that engages in those activities.71 Because those seeking business deductions
for dues or other payments made to trade associations have the burden of
showing the portion of their payments not attributable to campaigning or
lobbying (by the recipient organization), the IRC requires that organizations
tell donors the percent of their payments attributable to the nondeductible
activities.72 The aggregate amounts spent on each of these activities should
also be listed on an organization’s information return,73 making possible an
estimate of the amount each trade association has spent each year on
campaign-related activities.
As a result of the complexities involved in tracing the sources of
campaign spending by independent expenditure entities, experts disagree
about whether, or to what degree, corporate and other business spending has
67
68

69

70
71
72
73

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003) (basing its statement on the record in the case).
For example, in the month before a recent special election in Alabama, at least one Super PAC
bought millions of dollars of advertisements on credit, thereby avoiding the need to disclose its
donors until after the election. See Ashley Balcerzak, Mystery Money Floods Alabama in Senate Race’s
Final Days, CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2017/
12/08/21368/mystery-money-floods-alabama-senate-races-final-days; see also CAMPAIGN LEGAL
CTR., DODGING DISCLOSURE: HOW SUPER PACS USED REPORTING LOOPHOLES AND DIGITAL
DISCLAIMER GAPS TO KEEP VOTERS IN THE DARK IN THE 2018 MIDTERMS (2018), available at
https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/11-29-18%20Post-Election%20Report%
20%281045%20am%29.pdf.
See 26 C.F.R. §1.501(c)(6)-1 (2019) (stating that a section 501(c)(6) organization “is an association of
persons having some common business interest,” that is devoted to advancing that common
business interest, although the organization cannot itself engage in a business for profit).
I.R.C. § 162(a).
See I.R.C. § 162(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20(c)(1) (2011).
See I.R.C. § 6033(e)(1).
See IRS, FORM 990 sched. C (2020).
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increased since Citizens United was decided. According to several sources,
large, publicly traded corporations have not increased their non-PAC
political spending.74 However, privately held corporations’ electoral
spending is not covered by this assertion, and according to one source
privately held businesses that used treasury funds on electoral spending “were
among 2012’s biggest sources of outside money.”75 In addition, as noted
earlier, business spending not subject to contribution limits may not be
captured when an intermediary vehicle, such as a section 527 organization,
a Super PAC, or an exempt organization is utilized.76 Data provided by The
Campaign Legal Center, a watchdog group, reveal that trade association
groups spent more than $129 million on election advertising from 2012 to
2016, and I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) groups spent more than $520 million on
elections during the same period.77 While it is probable that trade
associations represent business interests, it is unclear what proportion of
spending by I.R.C. §501(c)(4) groups reflects business interests because these
groups do not need to reveal the identities of their contributors and their
missions may be attractive to an array of interests, not all of which are
business oriented.
What is known is that overall, contributions to Super PACs in 2015–2016
by entities of all kinds (such as unions, corporations, trade associations, PACs,
and Super PACs) totaled $519,000,161, or 32% of contributions to Super
PACs in that election cycle and that between a third and half of that sum
came from business interests.78 Again, these are amounts disclosed and the

74

75
76

77
78

See MICHAEL J. MALBIN & BRENDAN GLAVIN, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., CFI’S GUIDE TO MONEY IN
FEDERAL ELECTIONS: 2016 IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 1 (2018); COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra
note 16, at 5, 6.
Andrew Mayersohn, Four Years After Citizens United: The Fallout, OPENSECRETS (Jan. 21, 2014),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/01/four-years-after-citizens-united-the-fallout.
See Trevor Potter, Citizens United Defenders Use Deceptive Arguments to Underestimate Money in Politics,
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://campaignlegal.org/update/citizens-uniteddefenders-use-deceptive-arguments-underestimate-money-politics (arguing, based upon data
provided by OpenSecrets.org, that Floyd Abrams’s claim that corporate spending since Citizens
United represents a “comparatively small” part of campaign spending during that period is “highly
misleading”). Potter also notes that data based upon corporate contributions to candidates for
president is misleading because ninety-nine percent of corporate PAC contributions in 2016 went
to candidates for Congress. Id.
See id.
COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 16, at 5 & fig. 2. The remaining 68% was contributed by
individuals. See id. CED’s statistics for Super PACs are based upon an analysis of the ninety largest
Super PACs, which were the source of 94% of Super PAC spending in 2015–2016. Id. at 4. Since
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immediate donors, whereas, as noted above, there are potentially large sums
of undisclosed spending that cannot be quantified and misleadingly disclosed
contributors that cannot be identified. Thus, since Super PACs became the
“primary vehicles of outside spending,”79 and outside spending accounted for
more than one fifth of election spending in 2015–2016,80 business interest
spending on elections has increased commensurately. Given that business
interests have also increased their spending under pre-Citizens United law
more than eight times,81 it is fair to conclude that campaign spending by
business interests today has increased dramatically over what it was at the
time of Buckley, even after correcting for inflation.
B. Spending by Individuals
Since Buckley, individuals singly have been able to spend unlimited
amounts directly on campaigns if they do not coordinate with a candidate or
a candidate’s campaign.82 In 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit greatly expanded individuals’ ability to
influence campaigns by enabling them to give unlimited amounts to groups,
if the groups act independently of candidates and their campaigns.83 This
decision, known as SpeechNow or SpeechNow.org, enabled individuals to amplify
the impact of their spending by combining their contributions with other
contributions—large and small, made by other individuals or by ideological
or business groups—in one campaign vehicle acting in a unified way. These
independent expenditure groups are now known as Super PACs.84
Even extremely large amounts spent by a wealthy individual singly can
have their impact amplified by being combined with contributions from
other individuals and entities. The amplification effect will be heightened
because none of the contributors to the recipient organizations will be subject

79
80
81

82
83
84

Super PACs are only required to report contributors who give $200 or more, the CED analysis is
based upon 81% of Super PAC receipts in 2015–2016.
ISSUE ONE, OUTSIDE SPENDING IN ELECTIONS (2017), available at https://www.issueone.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/outside-spending.pdf.
Id.
See supra notes 36–50 and accompanying text. The statistics cited in this section include only
reported expenditures. See infra Part I.D (discussing the post-Buckley trend of outside money spent
on campaign-oriented issue advertisements not subject to reporting).
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976) (per curiam).
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 693, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
On Super PACs, see generally R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42042, SUPER
PACS IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2016); Richard Briffault,
Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2012).
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to dollar limits, so the resulting combined funds are in principle unlimited.
In the 2015–2016 election cycle, Super PACs spent in excess of $1.1 billion,
which was almost half of the spending of all PACs active in the election cycle
combined.85 One estimate based upon data available from the FEC found
that almost 68% of contributions to Super PACs came from individuals.86 A
large part of that amount came from contributions that would not have been
legal before SpeechNow.org,87 given that prior to that decision individuals could
give at most $5000 to a single PAC.88 In the 2015–2016 cycle, of the $1.1
billion contributed by individuals to Super PACs, the top 1% of individual
donors (511 individuals) contributed $1.05 billion or 88.6% of all individual
contributions, and the remaining 50,559 individuals who gave to those Super
PACs in aggregate contributed 11.4% of the total.89 Similarly, records reveal
that 85% of the money raised by the Super PAC associated with Hillary
Clinton’s 2016 campaign came from donors who contributed at least $1
million dollars.90 Taking into account other unlimited spending vehicles,
such as I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) organizations, OpenSecrets estimates that the top
one percent of the top one percent (.01%) of the American adult population
85

86

87

88

89
90

See FEC Press Release, Statistical Summary of 24-Month Campaign Activity of the 2015–2016
Election Cycle (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.fec.gov/updates/statistical-summary-24-monthcampaign-activity-2015-2016-election-cycle/ (identifying $1.8 billion in disbursements from all
separate segregated fund PACs and all nonconnected PACs); see also NATHANIEL PERSILY,
ROBERT BAUER & BENJAMIN L. GINSBERG, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN
THE UNITED STATES: ASSESSING AN ERA OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 38 (2018), available at
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-Democracy-Campaign-Financ
e-in-the-United-States.pdf (explaining that Super PACs raised $1.8 billion but only spent $1.1
billion in the 2016 election cycle).
See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 16, at 5 & fig. 2 (noting that individuals accounted for
67.7% of itemized contributions to Super PACs, or $1,086,032,803). This is “roughly double the
$534 million individuals gave to Super PACs in 2012.” David B. Magleby, Super PACs and 501(c)
Groups in the 2016 Election 7 (Nov. 9–10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://www.uakron.edu/bliss/state-of-the-parties/papers/magleby.pdf; see also Persily et al., supra
note 85 (noting the difference between amounts contributed to Super PACS and Super PAC
expenditures).
See MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 74, at 42, tbl. 1-9A (showing that 96% of contributions made by
individuals and groups to Super PACs for presidential candidates in 2016 were in amounts greater
than $5400); ZACHARY ALBERT, TRENDS IN CAMPAIGN FINANCING, 1980–2016, at 18–19 (2017)
(showing that the top 25% of individual donors gave 90% of campaign funds in 2016).
This cap on individual contributions to regular PACs was established by the 1976 amendments to
FECA, which were enacted in response to the Buckley decision. See Federal Elections Campaign Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-283, §112, 90 Stat. 475 (enacting 2 U.S.C. §441(a)(1)(C)).
See Super PACS: How Many Donors Give, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespend
ing/donor_stats.php?cycle=2016&type=I (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 74, at 9.
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by wealth gave more than $2.3 billion in 2015–2016, which was 45% more
than the parallel group gave in 2012.91
Thus, the changes initiated by Citizens United, and extended by
SpeechNow.org, which enable individuals to give unlimited amounts to
independent expenditure entities, have resulted in a dramatic increase in the
overall amount contributed by individuals to such organizations. One
analysis has estimated that more than $1 billion of total federal election
spending in the 2015–2016 cycle is attributable to changes in the law made
by Citizens United and SpeechNow.org.92 Regardless of whether one finds these
amounts troubling as a policy matter, they have created an electoral
environment unimaginable to the Buckley Court. Equally dramatic, the
changes discussed have made it possible for a small number of extremely
wealthy individuals to dominate outside spending vehicles.93 The potential
dominance over specific races attributable to contributions from such a small
number of donors may mark the greatest departure of the current electoral
landscape from electoral politics at the time of Buckley.
In addition to the impact of Citizens United and SpeechNow.org, the potential
for greatly increased individual spending on behalf of traditional recipients
of regulated contributions also may have occurred because of a change in the
law regarding aggregate spending, although it is too soon to know what the
actual effects of the change will be. The legal change occurred when the
Supreme Court ruled in McCutcheon v. FEC that Buckley-era caps on aggregate
per-election-cycle spending cycle are unconstitutional.94 At the time of the
Buckley decision, the aggregate contribution limit on individuals imposed by
FECA was $25,000,95 or $105,451 in 2016 dollars. As a result of the Court’s
91
92

93

94
95

Sultan, supra note 16 (noting that the increase in number of individuals in 2016 was only three
percent).
See ADAM LIOZ, JUHEM NAVARRO-RIVERA & SEAN MCELWEE, DEMOS, COURT CASH: 2016
ELECTION MONEY RESULTING DIRECTLY FROM SUPREME COURT RULINGS 2, 4, 7, 17 n.10
(2017), available at http://www.demos.org/publication/court-cash-2016-election-money-resultingdirectly-supreme-court-rulings.
Not all of these groups need to report all of the funds they raise or spend. See What Super Pacs, NonProfits, and Other Groups Spending Outside Money Must Disclose About the Source and Use of Their Funds,
OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/rules.php (last visited Apr. 5,
2020). Thus, the figures in the text outlining the concentration of wealthy donors are necessarily
incomplete. For outside spending, see infra Part I.C.
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 193 (2014).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976) (per curiam). The limit had already increased to $123,200
by 2012. McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 194; R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43334,
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS: SELECTED QUESTIONS ABOUT MCCUTCHEON AND POLICY
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (2014).
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invalidation of the aggregate contribution limit in McCutcheon, the maximum
aggregate contribution limit per individual is now estimated to be $3,628,000
in an election cycle, if the individual gives the maximum permitted to each
federal candidate and entities associated with the candidates and parties.96
In constant (2016) dollars, this is an increase of more than thirty times per
individual contributor. It is unlikely, however, that many, if any, individuals
will spend the theoretical maximum this way. Nevertheless, a watchdog
group found that 646 individuals had given “at or near the overall limit”
before McCutcheon was decided and, thus, that the increase in aggregate
spending now permitted could enable high-wealth individuals to greatly
magnify their influence on particular candidates.97
In sum, wealthy individuals employing unlimited contribution vehicles
now fund an enormous share of the spending in federal campaigns. The
implications for Buckley 2.0 are discussed in Parts II–III.
C. Outside Spending
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, since Citizens United there
has been “an explosion of election-related outside spending.”98 The term
“outside spending” often refers to spending on elections by persons other
than candidates, their campaigns, and political parties.99 The main examples

96
97

98
99

McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 268 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Bob Biersack, McCutcheon’s Multiplying Effect: Why an Overall Limit Matters, OPENSECRETS NEWS
(Sept. 17, 2013, 11:38 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/09/mccutcheonsmultiplying-effect-why.
Roy Slatko, Politiquizz: Outside Spenders and the IRS, OPENSECRETS NEWS (Mar. 12, 2014, 1:00 PM),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/03/politiquizz-outside-spenders-and-th/.
See, e.g., WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT & CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, SPECIAL REPORT ON
OUTSIDE GROUP ACTIVITY, 2000–2016 (2016), http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/DisclosureReport_FINAL-5.pdf; IAN VANDEWALKER, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST., ELECTION SPENDING 2016: OUTSIDE GROUPS OUTSPEND CANDIDATES AND
PARTIES IN KEY SENATE RACES (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/fi
les/publications/Election%20Spending%202016%20outside%20groups%20outspend.pdf. Some
authorities consider political party committees outside spending groups. DAVID B. MAGLEBY, The
2012 Election as a Team Sport, in FINANCING THE 2012 ELECTION 2 (2014). Since some political
party spending can be coordinated with candidates and some can be independent, parties may in
fact be considered outside groups when their spending is independent of candidates. See Making
Independent Expenditures as A Political Party Committee, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-andcommittees/making-disbursements-political-party/making-independent-expenditures-political-pa
rty-committee (last visited May 17, 2020). Some would not consider single-candidate Super PACs
and Leadership Super PACS “outside.”
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of such entities are exempt organizations described in a subsection of 501(c)
of the IRC,100 section 527 organizations, and Super PACs. Most
organizations described in 501(c) are social welfare organizations, labor
groups, and trade associations and chambers of commerce.101 Together
these groups and Super PACs are estimated to have spent between $1.5 and
$1.8 billion in 2015–2016, which represents more than 20% of the roughly
$6.5 billion spent on that election.102 This amount is almost 50% greater
than the amount of outside spending in 2012.103 During the 2018 mid-term
elections, outside spending was roughly $1.3 billion, which represented a
60% increase over the previous mid-term election.104
The term “outside spending” is intended to connote spending by groups
or individuals that are independent of candidates. In order to be entitled to
receive contributions that are not capped by FECA contribution limits, the
entities spending must be independent of candidates because the Supreme
Court first justified unlimited spending by corporations using their corporate
treasuries (instead of their PAC money) on the ground that there would be
no possibility of campaign corruption as long as corporate expenditures were
not coordinated with a candidate.105 One type of independent expenditure
100
101
102

103

104

105

See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)–(6) (2018).
See supra note 93.
See Press Release, FEC, Statistical Summary of 24-Month Campaign Activity of the 2015–2016
Election Cycle (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.fec.gov/updates/statistical-summary-24-monthcampaign-activity-2015-2016-election-cycle/ (showing that independent expenditure only political
committees spent $1.8 billion in 2015–2016). Other sources state that Super PACs spent
$1,066,914,448 during that cycle in addition to more than $200 million spent by exempt
organizations. Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/
fes_summ.php?cycle=2016 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). The statistics do not reflect election spending
not reported to the FEC, e.g., messages like electioneering communications broadcast outside the
thirty- and sixty-day regulated periods. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(b)–(e) (2019); infra Part I.D.
See Outside Spending in Elections, ISSUEONE, http://www.issueone.org/wp-content/uploads/2017
/09/outside-spending.pdf (last visited May 17, 2020). Outside spending in 2012 accounted for
16.5% of total election spending, while in 2016, it was 21.7%. See id. These amounts reflect only
expenditures reported to the FEC. Other election related spending by outside groups is not
captured by these figures. For parallel statistics that include spending by parties as outside spending,
see WESLEYAN MEDIA PROJECT & CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, supra note 99.
See Soo Rin Kim, Midterms Spending Overview: Total Expected to Reach $5.2 Billion, ABC NEWS (Nov. 6,
2018), https://abcnews.go.com/beta-story-container/Politics/midterms-spending-overview-totalcost-expected-reach-52/story?id=58996037.
For a fuller account of Citizens United, its reasoning, and developments based upon that decision, see
infra Part II.B. This decision applies to union spending not funded by union PACs as well. See What
Citizens United Means for Union Political Spending, CTR. FOR UNION FACTS,
https://www.unionfacts.com/article/political-money/what-citizens-united-means-for-unionpolitical-spending (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
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entity that arose in the wake of Citizens United and its progeny was the Super
PAC, which is “super” because it is permitted to receive contributions not
subject to FECA contribution limits as long as the Super PAC operates
independently of candidates and their campaigns, as independence is defined
in the regulations implementing FECA.106 It should be noted, however, that
a significant portion of Super PACs are single-candidate Super PACs: their
expenditures are made exclusively on behalf of a single candidate, although
they do not coordinate their activities with that candidate, as coordination is
defined by the FEC. In 2012, roughly 42% of Super PAC spending was
attributable to single-candidate Super PACs; by 2016, half of Super PAC
spending was attributable to them.107
Is outside spending a bad thing? Some have argued that outside money
enables a wider range of voices to be heard during campaigns than was
possible when candidates and party committees dominated campaign
spending.108 That may be true, given that FEC reports indicate that the
amount of outside spending has surpassed the amount of candidate spending
in a growing number of races since 2008.109 However, who these newly

106
107

108

109

On the FECA standard for independence, see infra Part II.B.5.
In 2012, single-candidate Super PACS spent $273,479,098. 2012 Outside Spending by Single-Candidate
Super PACs, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle
=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=C (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). In 2012, total Super PAC spending
was $609,936,792.
Outside Spending: Total by Type of Spender, 2012, OPENSECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/fes_summ.php?cycle=2012 (last visited Apr. 5,
2020). In 2016, single-candidate Super PACs spent over $530,000,000. 2016 Outside Spending by
Single-Candidate Super PACs, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/su
mm.php?cycle=2016&chrt=V&disp=O&type=C (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, Why the Media Hate Super PACs, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 6, 2015, 9:00 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/11/campaign-finance-super-pacs/ (arguing that Super
PACs allow citizens to speak to other citizens without interference); Bradley A. Smith, Citizens
United Gives Freedom of Speech Back to the People, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2015), http://blogs.re
uters.com/great-debate/2015/01/16/citizens-united-gives-freedom-of-speech-back-to-the-people
(“Citizens United has made it far easier for challengers to compete with incumbents . . . .”).
See Independent Spending Dominated the Closest Senate and House Races in 2016, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. (Nov.
10, 2016), http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/16-11-10/independent_spending_dominated
_the_closest_senate_and_house_races_in_2016.aspx; Races in Which Outside Spending Exceeds
Candidate Spending, 2018 Election Cycle, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outside
spending/outvscand.php?cycle=2018 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (listing twenty-eight House and
Senate races in which outside spending exceeded candidate spending, sometimes by large
percentages); see also VANDEWALKER, supra note 99 (arguing that outside groups spent more than
both candidates and political parties combined in ten key Senate races). OpenSecrets lists this data
for election cycles going back to 2000, when there were zero such instances. Races in Which Outside
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empowered voices are, and whom or what they represent, is only partially
known. In the case of Super PACs, the names of individual donors are
revealing, while some of the entity names are revealing, and others are not.
Individuals, who are responsible for roughly two-thirds of the Super PAC
receipts, can be identified using lists compiled by OpenSecrets.org and
similar watchdog groups.110 In contrast, as was noted earlier, exempt
organizations are given great latitude to engage in campaign activities,111 but
they are not required to disclose their donors to the public. In general, then,
the origin of much of the hundreds of millions of dollars spent by outside
groups cannot be identified.112
It is impossible, therefore, to know if outside spending in fact makes
possible the participation of a wide variety of voices that otherwise would not
be heard or would not be heard effectively. Based upon the fragmentary
evidence available, it seems that much outside spending consists of voices
already well represented in elections that are now greatly amplified by means
of unlimited contributions that are pooled in independent spending vehicles.
The same evidence shows that outside spending vehicles are increasingly
dominated by mega-donations contributed by a small number of high-wealth
individuals.113 It seems, then, that the rapid growth of outside spending
coupled with the dominance of contributions by a tiny percentage of donors
poses the risk that a handful of extremely wealthy people rather than citizens
at large, or donors generally, will derive the benefit afforded by this new
campaign finance phenomenon.
D. Issue Advocacy
When Buckley was handed down, the art of creating issue ads to influence
an election without being subject to regulation114 had not yet been refined,

110

111
112

113
114

Spending Exceeds Candidate Spending, 2000 Election Cycle, OPENSECRETS, https://www.open
secrets.org/outsidespending/outvscand.php?cycle=2000.
See 2018 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outside
spending/summ.php?cycle=2018&disp=D&type=V&superonly=N (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). By
clicking on the “Cycle” dropdown menu, donor data as far back as 2004 is available.
See supra note 65.
See Political Nonprofits (Dark Money), OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outside
spending/nonprof_summ.php (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (showing the total amount of spending by
groups with no disclosure of donors).
See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
Some issue advertisements can also be subject to regulation under provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code prohibiting or restricting political campaign activity engaged in by exempt organizations as
well as through FECA regulation. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2006-1 C.B. 264; Rev. Rul. 2007-41,
2007-25 I.R.B. 1421.
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because the distinction Buckley drew between express advocacy and other
campaign-related spending spawned the industry devoted to crafting
electoral advertising ostensibly discussing issues rather than candidates. An
issue ad is a public communication addressing a subject of potential interest
to the public, and it may be made to educate or persuade people about a
subject, with or without the intent to influence their vote in an election. For
example, in order to persuade people to use reusable shopping bags, an
environmental group may run ads informing the public that discarded plastic
bags end up in rivers and kill fish who ingest too many of them.
The Buckley Court emphasized that pure issue discussion enjoys the
highest level of First Amendment protection because such discussion is
critical for ensuring an informed public and because the First Amendment
protects free expression to the greatest extent possible. It ruled that
communications during campaigns containing express advocacy could be
subject to regulation by the FEC, but attempts to regulate other forms of
speech during elections could pose a threat to the pure discussion of issues,
especially when the difference between issue advocacy and campaign
advocacy was unclear.115 After concluding that the FECA provision
regulating expenditures would be unconstitutionally vague unless limited to
express advocacy, the Buckley Court noted that adept lawyers would have no
trouble authoring messages that evaded FECA restrictions, since all they had
to do was avoid words of express advocacy, such as “elect” or “defeat” Joe
Smith, or their equivalents.116 The Court was prescient, and in ensuing
years, the phrase “sham issue advocacy” was coined to describe issue ads
communicated with the intent to influence votes for candidates while evading
FECA campaign restrictions imposed upon express advocacy, e.g., disclosure
rules and rules requiring “hard” or PAC money to fund those
communications.117 Using the plastic bag example, urging people to stop
115
116

117

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 44 n.52. Some commentators and courts have stated that few election ads contain express
advocacy. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 127 (2003); BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., Magic
Words, in STRAIGHT TALK ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE: SEPARATING FACT FROM FICTION (2009),
available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/paper5.pdf. However,
FEC data indicate that, since Citizens United was decided, and probably because of it, the rate of
spending on express advocacy has skyrocketed. See Magleby, supra note 86, at 5 (stating that total
reported independent expenditures in 2016 were $1,631,002,075).
See Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding
Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265 (2000); BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, EXPRESS
ADVOCACY AND ISSUE ADVOCACY: HISTORICAL AND LEGAL EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL
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using plastic bags because of the environmental harm is pure issue advocacy.
A similar ad broadcast near an election that also notes which candidates
support or oppose a “bag tax” may be intended to influence how people vote
in that election, but it would not be subject to regulation, despite its
motivation, because it lacks words explicitly calling for the election or defeat
of a candidate.
In 2002, Congress sought to curb the unregulated funding of issue ads
likely aimed at influencing voters’ choice of candidates by amending FECA
to include a new category of campaign speech called “electioneering
communications.”
The new category was defined to include
communications using broadcast media (but not print or mail) that mention
or otherwise refer to a specific federal candidate and that are made in the
thirty days before a primary or sixty days before an election, if the ads target
at least 50,000 members of the relevant electorate for that candidate.118 The
new provisions compelled the disclosure of the amounts and sources of
electioneering communications and, if the funders of the communications
were corporations or labor unions, the provisions required them to use PAC
funds to pay for the ads.119
The electioneering provisions were upheld against a constitutional
challenge in McConnell v. FEC.120 However, in 2007, the Supreme Court
revised and narrowed the definition of an electioneering communication for
purposes of the ban on corporate funding so that it included little more than
express advocacy.121 In 2010, Citizens United held that corporations and
unions could use general treasury funds to pay for express advocacy and
electioneering communications as long as the communications were not
coordinated with a candidate or campaign.122 The result of Citizens United
was thus to further undermine BCRA’s electioneering communication
provision, thereby restoring corporations’ ability to spend potentially
unlimited amounts on issue ads intended to influence voting for specific
candidates, even if they explicitly refer to candidates and are broadcast on

118
119
120
121
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ADVERTISING 23–25, www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_106
67.pdf (last accessed Apr. 5, 2020).
52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(3) (2018).
The provision was part of a larger campaign finance reform effort. See Part I.A.2.
McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (holding that the ban could only apply to
electioneering communications that were the functional equivalent of express advocacy). But see
infra note 123 and accompanying text.
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360–65 (2010).
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the eve of primaries and elections, as long as the corporations do not
coordinate with the candidates or their campaigns.
The amounts spent on issue ads intended to influence the election of
candidates is difficult to capture since such spending is not in general
disclosed in public records. However, Wisconsin Right to Life and Citizens United
left undisturbed the disclosure rules pertaining to the original definition of
electioneering communications; as a result, individuals and groups that fund
issue ads mentioning or otherwise identifying a candidate in the period
shortly before a primary or election must continue to report such
expenditures to the FEC.123 In that event, the identities of individuals and
groups who directly finance such communications would become public, as
would the amounts they give for that purpose. However, since the definition
does not include ads in print media, mail, or social media (even in the period
shortly before a primary or election) and it only covers broadcast advertising
during that time frame,124 most election-related issue advocacy will not need
to be disclosed. Thus, most amounts spent on issue ads targeted to influence
elections but not subject to reporting as independent expenditures cannot be
known with any precision.125 Spending on issue ads in the 1997–1998
congressional election cycle has been estimated at between $135 million and
$150 million.126 The Annenberg Public Policy Center estimated that $509
million was spent on broadcast issue ads alone in 2000.127 In 2010, according
to OpenSecrets.org, tax-exempt social welfare organizations spent $127
million on ads and other electoral activities, and they spent $308 million in
2012.128 They are not, however, in general required to reveal the identities
123
124
125

126

127

128

See id. at 368–71.
See supra note 25.
For a detailed discussion of disclosure rules that apply to certain issue advertisements, see generally
What Super PACs, Non-Profits, and Other Groups Spending Money Must Disclose About the Source and Use of
Their Funds, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrests.org/outsidespending/rules.php (last visited
Apr. 5, 2020).
Jeffrey D. Stanger & Douglas G. Rivlin, Issue Advocacy Advertising During the 1997–1998 Election Cycle,
ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR. (1998), http://library.law.columbia.edu/urlmirror/CLR/
100CLR620/report.htm.
JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REP. NO. 97-91, SOFT AND HARD MONEY IN
CONTEMPORARY ELECTIONS: WHAT FEDERAL LAW DOES AND DOES NOT REGULATE 5 (Mar.
15, 2002).
The 10 Things They Won’t Tell You About Money-in-Politics, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensec
rets.org/resources/10things/03.php (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). Organizations exempt under
section 501(c)(4)–(6) of the Internal Revenue Code can engage in various kinds of campaign activity as
long as such activity (combined with other activities not components of their exempt purpose) does
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of their contributors, and even when they make required disclosures for
independent expenditures, they may not be required to disclose the identities
of donors unless the donors earmark their contributions specifically for
reportable expenditures.129 Similarly, figures for “political ad” spending are
not helpful because they include numerous kinds of campaign advertising
other than issue advocacy intended to influence votes on candidates.130
In short, although there may have been campaign-oriented issue
advocacy at the time Buckley was litigated, there are no precise (or even
imprecise) estimates of the amounts spent on such activity then. Similarly, it
is impossible to quantify such issue advocacy today. Because outside group
spending has skyrocketed since Citizens United, and much spending by outside
groups appears to be campaign-oriented, the phenomenon of campaign ads
masquerading as issue advocacy, which Buckley predicted,131 has contributed
to record campaign spending by commercial and non-commercial interests,
whether funded by individuals or groups.
E. Conclusion
Hard data relating to many contemporary campaign practices are
difficult or impossible to obtain, largely because of the absence of disclosure
requirements in existing law, but also because of stratagems adopted by those
who wish to influence the outcome of elections by injecting massive amounts
of money while remaining invisible. Despite this, as this Part has shown,
there is an abundance of evidence that there has been rapid growth in the
amount of campaign spending attributable to business interests and more
massive increases in the amounts spent by individuals, some of whom spend
millions or tens of millions of dollars to influence the outcome of federal
campaigns. These changes have profound implications for policymakers and
lawmakers that are beyond the scope of the present analysis. These changes
may also have consequences for the application of the legal doctrines and
reasoning set forth in the Buckley decision more than forty years ago. It is the
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130
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not become their primary activity. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2) (exempting organizations
that operate exclusively for the social welfare).
See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. For reporting of contributions funding their
electioneering communications, see supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Megan Janetsky, Low Transparency, Low Regulation Online Political Ads Skyrocket, OPENSECRETS
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2018/03/low-transparency-low-regulationonline-political-ads-skyrocket/ (summarizing spending on both broadcast and online
advertisements since 2010).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (per curiam).
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latter concerns that Parts II–III and the Buckley 2.0 thought experiment
address.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE DOCTRINE
The main issues discussed in Buckley were limits on campaign
contributions, limits on independent expenditures, aggregate limits, public
financing, and the creation and operation of the FEC.132 Although much
could be said about all of these subjects,133 Buckley 2.0 will focus on the first
two, which constitute the largest part of the campaign finance discussion
today.
A. Contributions to Candidates
The contribution question in Buckley was whether the newly enacted
$1000 cap on contributions to candidates and their campaign committees
was constitutional.134 The challengers argued that the caps impermissibly
burdened their freedom of speech and especially their freedom of political
expression.135 The Supreme Court upheld the limits. It reasoned, first, that
the burden on individuals limited to contributions to candidates of $1000 per
primary and an additional $1000 in the general election was real but “only a
marginal restriction” on their free speech and, second, that the government
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption was “a
constitutionally sufficient justification” for imposing this burden.136 The
Court considered the limit a marginal restriction for two reasons. First, it
viewed contributions as symbolic speech137 since they show general support
for a candidate, but do not translate directly into an expression of support for
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134
135
136
137

Id. at 7.
See generally Liz Kennedy & Seth Katsuya Endo, The World According to, and After McCutcheon v.
FEC, and Why It Matters, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 533 (2015) (discussing the impact of McCutcheon and
the significance of aggregate contribution limits); Note, Eliminating the FEC: The Best Hope for Campaign
Finance Regulation?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1421 (2018) (analyzing the FEC’s weaknesses and arguing
that it should be eliminated rather than reformed).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23. The cap also applied to contributions to intermediaries if earmarked for
candidates. Id. at 24.
Id. at 11, 14–15.
Id. at 20–21, 26–27.
Id. at 21.
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specific views or reasons.138 A candidate can, for example, use contributed
funds for ads or activities relating to issues not important to the donor; thus,
the political expression funded would be a choice made by the recipient of
the money rather than the donor. The highest degree of First Amendment
protection goes to the donor’s own speech rather than that of the recipient of
the donor’s largesse.139 Buckley also stated that contribution limits are a
marginal burden because they do not “in any way infringe the contributor’s
freedom to discuss candidates and issues,”140 since contributors can still make
independent expenditures, join political groups, and volunteer to advance
their political views.141
One question Buckley 2.0 would consider today is whether the current
limit on individuals’ contributions to candidates is unconstitutionally small.
The maximum contribution to a candidate at the time of Buckley was $1000
per primary or election,142 which would be $4486 for each in 2016 dollars.
The maximum that individuals could contribute to a candidate in a primary
or a general election in 2015–2016 was $2700,143 or roughly 60% of the
Buckley era inflation-adjusted amount. Current contribution limits have not
kept pace with the Buckley-era limits because Congress did not initially peg
them to inflation. It was not until 2002 that Congress increased the
maximum individual contribution to candidates for primaries and elections
from $1000 to $2000 and also provided for an inflation adjustment to that
amount by election cycle.144
The $1000 limit on contributions was challenged in the original Buckley
as unconstitutional because larger contributions would not raise the threat of
corruption, which was the government’s justification for imposing the
limits.145 The Court first responded that Congress could constitutionally
conclude that some limit is necessary to avoid corruption or its
138
139
140
141
142
143

144
145

See id. at 21 (noting that a contribution indicates support for a candidate, but without
“communicat[ing] the underlying basis for the support”).
See id. at 21 (stating that contributions involve “speech by someone other than the contributor”).
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-443, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
Contribution Limits for 2015–2016, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/updates/contribution-limits-for2015-2016 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). Individuals can give additional amounts to federal PACs,
national party committees, and state, district, or local party committees. See Contribution Limits, FEC,
https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/contribution-li
mits/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307(a), (d), 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976) (per curiam).
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appearance.146 It then conceded that Congress could have created a different
standard, but held that its failure to do so did not make the provision invalid
as long as the limit chosen was narrowly tailored to prevent the harm
described.147 The Court also quoted with approval the appellate court’s
statement that it is not for a court to decide whether the limit should be $2000
or $1000, once Congress found that some limit was necessary to avoid
corruption or its appearance.148 For the Buckley Court, the test was whether
the contribution limits “prevented candidates and political committees from
amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.”149 All candidates
need sufficient resources, but the effective advocacy standard is especially
critical for challengers who hope to replace incumbents but are hampered
because of the many tangible and intangible benefits of incumbency their
opponents enjoy.150 The Buckley Court exhibited an attitude of deference to
the legislature’s judgments when it upheld the $1000 limit, explaining that
the limit would not have “any dramatic adverse effect” on raising campaign
funds, and it indicated that Congress was free to choose $1000 rather than
$2000 since the former did not preclude effective advocacy by candidates.151
Buckley 2.0 would apply the effective advocacy test of the original Buckley
to assess the validity of the contribution cap for individuals ($2,700 for each
primary and election in 2015–2016), which will be adjusted for inflation
regularly.152 It would likely start by reviewing judicial decisions since Buckley
that addressed challenges to contribution caps. The most recent and relevant
such case, Randall v. Sorrell,153 itself summarized the history of state and federal
challenges to contribution limits. It noted that “the Court has consistently

146
147
148
149
150

151
152

153

Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 30, 33.
Id. at 30 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
Id. at 21. The Buckley Court found that the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence that contribution
limits “in themselves” discriminate unfairly between challengers and incumbents. Id. at 32.
Id. at 31 n.33. See also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402–04 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (describing some benefits enjoyed by incumbents); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230,
248–49 (2006) (plurality opinion) (discussing the role of contribution caps in limiting the incumbent
advantage).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 34–35.
See Contribution Limits, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidatetaking-receipts/contribution-limits (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). The cap is $2,800 per election, per
candidate, for 2019–2020.
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
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upheld contribution limits.”154 At the same time, even cases upholding
contribution limits have cautioned that low limits can have the effect of
making it difficult for challengers to challenge incumbents successfully.155
In Randall, which examined Vermont’s contribution limits relating to
several state-wide offices, the Court held that the restrictions were
unconstitutional. It emphasized that its ruling did not rest exclusively on the
low dollar limits of $200–$400, depending upon the office; rather, the state
had also imposed severe restraints on political parties and volunteers.156
Further, the dollar limits were not indexed for inflation.157 Thus, the Court
suspended its usual deference to lawmakers’ assessments of what is necessary
to avoid the threat of corruption or its appearance when very low dollar limits
were combined with associated campaign constraints in such a way as to
make effective advocacy difficult.
Buckley 2.0 would certainly apply the doctrinal norms these cases reflect
to the empirical reality of contemporary campaign funding. For example,
the Court would note the total cost of elections as well as the cost of
congressional and presidential contests separately. Adjusted for inflation, the
cost of presidential contests has not necessarily increased each election
cycle.158 In contrast, the cost of congressional races in constant dollars has
more than doubled since 2000.159
Several watchdog groups and nonpartisan organizations have gathered
and analyzed data about the sources of campaign contributions and the
characteristics of donors that would aid the Court in reaching a decision. In
154
155
156

157
158

159

Id. at 247 (first citing Nixon, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); then citing Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182
(1981)).
Id. at 248–49.
Id. at 253. The Vermont contribution caps were “the lowest in the Nation,” id. at 250, and they
were a small fraction of the limits approved in Buckley, almost thirty years earlier. Id. at 250–51. In
addition, the statute required volunteers to treat their expenses as contributions, id. at 259–60,
which could severely restrict how much volunteering people could do if they incurred such things
as transportation costs.
Id. at 252.
See Cost of Election, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/cost.php?display=T&
infl=Y (compiling the cost of total, presidential, and congressional elections from 1998–2018). All
spending (in inflation adjusted dollars), including PAC spending, was $2,053,679,582 in 2000,
$2,539,322,657 in 2004, $3,230,405,854 in 2008, $2,859,684,723 in 2012, and $2,495,740,931 in
2016. The 2016 figures, which were lower than expected, were explained by the free publicity
given to Donald J. Trump, see infra note 298, although the 2012 total was almost $400 million less
than the 2008 total.
See id. (showing that spending on congressional races was $2,498,050,032 in 2000 and
$5,725,183,133 in 2018).
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the last three presidential election cycles, there were wide variations in the
percentage of total contributions to candidates for all offices that were small
($200 or less) or larger, up to the election or election cycle limit.160 Buckley
2.0 would undoubtedly note the dramatic increase in the number of
individual contributors to federal campaigns,161 while the inflation-adjusted
average contribution per individual has decreased.162 This suggests that
current contribution limits have not discouraged participation by individuals
in elections, which was a concern of Buckley.163 In fact, internet platforms
that comply with FEC contribution regulations, like ActBlue, have facilitated
the growth of small- and medium-sized donations to candidates.164
Because many sources aggregate a donor’s contributions to candidates,
parties, and other recipients, it is difficult to determine whether $2700 or
$5400 per candidate per election cycle (or $2,800 for 2019–2020) is too low,
since it may be only one piece of a donor’s giving. As was true when the
original Buckley was decided, donors can also give to party committees of

160

161

162

163
164

See MALBIN & GLAVIN, supra note 74, at 31–33 (showing individual contributions to all presidential
candidates in primaries); id. at 41 (showing individual contributions to general election presidential
candidates); id. at 13–14, 61–62 (showing individual contributions to House and Senate candidates).
The statistics for congressional candidates are less revealing because contributions of $1000 or more
are not further subdivided. For example, in 2012, roughly 50% of Mitt Romney’s receipts from
individuals were less than the $2500 cap in that election cycle, compared with 78% for Barack
Obama. Id.; CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION TO GENERAL ELECTION
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, AGGREGATED BY DONORS, FULL TWO-YEAR CYCLES, 2008–2016
http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/2016Report/pdf/CFI_Federal-CF_16_Table1-08.pdf (last
accessed May 17, 2020).
See PERSILY, BAUER & GINSBERG, supra note 85, at 22 (noting that 3.2 million people made
contributions to federal campaigns in 2016 compared to roughly 66,000 in 1982); See ALBERT, supra
note 87, at 17 (noting that the number of individual contributors increased 487% during this
period).
See ALBERT, supra note 87, at 17 (noting that the average total contribution from each individual
“has declined sharply since 1982” and that the average individual contribution was less in 2016
than in any election since 1982). The figures are direct contributions from individuals to all
candidates per election, and not to each candidate. Id.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28–29, 36 (1976) (per curiam).
In the 2018 non-presidential election cycle, ActBlue, which raises money for federal, state, and local
Democratic candidates and organizations, raised roughly $1.7 billion. See 2018 Election Cycle in
Review, ACTBLUE, https://report.actblue.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). This was roughly double
the amount ActBlue had raised in the 2016 presidential election cycle. Id. Almost 64% of donors
on ActBlue in 2018 were first-time donors to ActBlue, and their contributions were 37% of the
money raised on the platform. See id. ActBlue classifies contributions of more than $200 as large
contributions. See ActBlue Contributors, 2018 Cycle, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/
pacs/pacgave2.php?cmte=C00401224&cycle=2018 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
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various kinds,165 in addition to outside groups such as PACs, Super PACs,
and exempt organizations. As a consequence, whether the limits on
contributions to candidates are large enough to make possible effective
advocacy by candidates cannot be determined in a vacuum, i.e., without
reference to other campaign rules, including those that have emerged since
the original Buckley. Among other things, Buckley 2.0 would review the
holdings in Citizens United and McCutcheon before reaching a conclusion about
the constitutionality of the limits on contributions by individuals to
candidates, measured by effective advocacy.
The original Buckley had expressed the view that independent spending
on behalf of a candidate by third parties could be significantly less helpful to
the candidate than the candidate’s own spending and that outside spending
could even undermine or otherwise harm the candidate’s message.166 Buckley
2.0 might, then, view the huge sums of outside spending in recent elections167
as a threat to a candidate’s effective advocacy. In that event, the Court could
find caps on contributions by individuals to candidates too low in the current
campaign finance environment to enable candidates themselves to raise
enough money to control their campaigns’ messages. It would note that in
some races, the amount of outside spending exceeds the amount of spending
by the candidate.168 Alternatively, Buckley 2.0 might conclude that many
Super PACs, especially single-candidate Super PACs, are “outside” groups
in name only since the alleged barrier between the group and the candidate
is so porous that much, if not most, single-candidate Super PAC spending
will clearly supplement or be the equivalent of candidate spending.169
Buckley 2.0’s final conclusion regarding individual contribution
limitations, then, must await its assessment of other aspects of the
contemporary electoral landscape, both empirical and doctrinal.170 For the
present, Buckley 2.0 would likely conclude that pre-McCutcheon aggregate
limits had the effect of depressing the amounts individuals could give to
multiple candidates because the aggregate cap created a zero-sum game in
which giving the maximum contribution to nine candidates would make it
165
166
167
168
169
170

See Contribution Limits, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidatetaking-receipts/contribution-limits (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra note 109.
See infra notes 239–43, 306 and accompanying text.
For example, the statistics quoted for the 2015–2016 election cycle may reflect the impact of
McCutcheon, which removed aggregate caps per election. Buckley 2.0 also envisions the implications
for effective advocacy if Citizens United and SpeechNow.org were no longer good law.
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impossible to contribute to others. In that event, taking into account the
failure of contribution limits for individuals to keep pace with inflation, the
rate of increase in the cost of campaigns, and the ability of outside spending
to overwhelm candidate spending, Buckley 2.0 could well find the preMcCutcheon limits on individual contributions to candidates unconstitutionally
small, despite its acknowledged deference to Congress regarding appropriate
restrictions to guard against corruption or its appearance. The reason would
be that the original Buckley also established effective advocacy as an
independent principle guiding its deliberations. Such a finding would not
necessarily require Buckley 2.0 to endorse McCutcheon, but it would likely
constitute an important factor in the Court’s assessment of McCutcheon. By
the same token, if Buckley 2.0 were to find the McCutcheon decision valid in
light of contemporary campaign practices, it would likely leave intact the
current rates coupled with FECA’s formula for raising dollar amounts on a
regular basis.
B. Contributions to Independent Spending Groups
The original Buckley invalidated FECA’s limits on independent
expenditures, that is, amounts spent by individuals and entities on expressly
advocating the election or defeat of specific candidates for federal office.171
Although it did not consider contributions to independent expenditure
groups, which did not exist at that time, the Buckley decision would inform
Buckley 2.0’s analysis of this practice through its reasoning about the
relationship between the threat of corruption and the character of
independent actors.
1. The Genesis of Unlimited Contributions to Independent Spending Groups
Unlimited donations to independent spending groups were authorized by
SpeechNow.org, an appellate court decision handed down in 2010.172 The D.C.
Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court’s assertion in Citizens United that
independent corporate spending could never give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption and extended that holding to contributions made
171
172

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16–20.
See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (holding that the government
violated the First Amendment by setting campaign contribution limits for independent expenditureonly groups like SpeechNow).
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by individuals or groups to independent spending entities.173 Some courts
and commentators have challenged SpeechNow.org’s holding.174 The Supreme
Court, however, has never reviewed the decision or the central issue.175
In Citizens United, the Court challenged the FECA provision requiring
corporations, unions, and certain other institutions to fund their campaign
contributions and their independent expenditures with money amassed in
PACs rather than with general revenues derived from their business (treasury
funds).176 The restrictions imposed by FECA on raising PAC money meant
that these entities would likely have less to spend on campaign activities than
would have been available from their treasury funds. The Citizens United
Court concluded that the rules prohibiting campaign spending from treasury
funds were unconstitutional if corporations or unions act independently of
candidates because independent action precludes the possibility of
corruption, which can only exist if there is a quid pro quo arrangement
between candidates and those who act on their behalf.177 In short, absent
coordination, there is no quid pro quo; absent quid pro quo, there is no
possibility of corruption.
The same year, the appellate court in SpeechNow.org held that it was
unconstitutional for the government to cap contributions that individuals and
others make to organizations involved in campaigns, if the recipient

173
174

175
176

177

SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 692–95.
See Albert W. Alschuler et al., Why Limits on Contributions to Super PACs Should Survive Citizens United,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2299, 2299 (2018) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit’s decision in SpeechNow.org
“created a regime in which contributions to candidates are limited but in which contributions to
less responsible groups urging votes for these candidates are unbounded” and that “the judgment
that the Constitution requires [this system of campaign financing] is astonishing . . . . Contrary to
the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning, contributions to super PACs can corrupt even when expenditures by
these groups do not”); Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions after McCutcheon, Citizens
United, and SpeechNow, 67 FLA. L. REV. 389, 471–77 (2015) (arguing that the SpeechNow court
relied on dictum from the Citzens United opinion and that the D.C. Circuit “should have focused on
Buckley’s holding that limits on contributions to official election campaigns are permissible and
should have asked whether limits on contributions to super PACs can reasonably be treated
differently”); see also Richard L. Hasen, Super PAC Contributions, Corruption, and the Proxy War Over
Coordination, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 15 (2014) (stating that “the arguments for
individual contribution limits applied to candidate campaign accounts and to single-candidate
reliable Super PACs appear to be very close to each other and roughly similar in strength”). For
courts that have resisted the holding, see Alschuler et al., supra, at 2308–09, 2311.
Hasen, supra note 174, at 11.
The plaintiffs in Citizens United originally challenged the constitutionality of the electioneering
communication as applied to them; however, the Court initiated the larger issue and had the case
re-briefed. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 321–22 (2010).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360–61.
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organizations act independently of candidates and their campaigns.178 The
SpeechNow.org court argued that, in Citizens United, the Supreme Court held
that “the government has no anti-corruption interest in limiting independent
expenditures.”179 As the SpeechNow.org court noted, to reach its conclusion,
Citizens United relied upon the observation made in Buckley that the absence
of coordination between a candidate and someone spending money to help
the candidate “alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”180 “Alleviates,”
however, means reduces; it does not mean precludes or prevents. Therefore,
the Buckley Court added the further observation that advocacy funded by
independent expenditures “does not presently appear to pose dangers of real
or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign
contributions.”181 The implication of “presently” is that it is in principle
possible that independent spending could at some time come to pose a
danger of real or apparent corruption equal to that of large contributions.
Noting this implication, the SpeechNow.org court pointed out that the Supreme
Court, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, had stated in a footnote that
Congress might present evidence that independent corporate expenditures
on behalf of a candidate could present “a danger of real or apparent
corruption,”182 even though Bellotti also held that—because the litigation
concerned a ballot initiative rather than an election involving candidates
potentially subject to corruption—no such danger existed in the case before
it.183 The SpeechNow.org court also mentioned two subsequent decisions by
the Supreme Court that upheld laws designed to prevent corruption
associated with independent corporate spending.184

178
179
180
181
182
183

184

SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 693–96.
Id. at 693.
Id. (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357). The result would be the same if the money was spent to
defeat a candidate’s opponent.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46; see also SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 693 (using “diminishes” to refer to the
Buckley Court’s caveat).
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978).
SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 693–94 (noting that in Bellotti, the Supreme Court “struck down a statelaw prohibition on corporate independent expenditures related to referenda”). The observation
was in a footnote, but it was dictum in any event because the case challenged a law preventing
corporations spending general funds to influence a ballot initiative, not the election of a candidate.
Id. at 694 (referring to Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654–55 (1990), as upholding
a state prohibition on corporate independent expenditures, and McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
203–09 (2003), as upholding the federal prohibition on corporate expenditures for electioneering
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Despite these precedents suggesting that independent expenditures could
pose the threat of corruption, the SpeechNow.org court, following Citizens
United, stated that Congress had no interest at all in limiting contributions by
the plaintiff groups in its own case because Citizens United had held as “a
matter of law” that independent expenditures could never pose a threat of
corruption or the appearance of corruption.185 In addition, the SpeechNow.org
court noted that Citizens United had asserted that corruption means quid pro
quo corruption for campaign finance purposes and, further, that quid pro
quo means agreement by one party to do something specific for another
party in exchange for financial or other support by the other party on the
first party’s behalf.186
The SpeechNow.org court traced the history of Supreme Court decisions
elaborating a broader understanding of corruption than the understanding
advanced by Citizens United, namely, the view that corruption includes
gaining influence with or access to an official, in addition to obtaining a
specific benefit. Citizens United rejected the broader understanding in favor
of a narrow definition that implies the impossibility of independent
expenditures corrupting as a matter of law.187 The SpeechNow.org court then
concluded that, based upon this position of Citizens United, the government
could have no interest in regulating independent electoral spending by
independent expenditure groups, and it extended this conclusion further to
hold that contributions by individuals to independent expenditure
organizations could not be limited because there was zero threat of
corruption to balance against the fundamental interest of political speech in
the form of contributions to such organizations.188 The SpeechNow.org
decision thus articulated as a constitutional right unlimited giving to electoral
entities as long as those entities operate independently of candidates for
public office.

185

186
187
188

communications, enacted in 2002). Austin was overturned by Citizens United, which also invalidated
parts of McConnell.
SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694–95; see also Douglas M. Spencer & Abby K. Wood, Citizens United,
States Divided: An Empirical Analysis of Independent Political Spending, 89 IND. L.J. 315, 318–19 (2014)
(calling Citizens United’s assertion a “legal fiction” that reveals the Court’s complete indifference to
what actually causes corruption as an empirical matter in favor of a blanket assertion without
evidentiary support).
SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694.
Id. (“The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that
these officials are corrupt.”) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357–59 (2010)).
Id. at 695 (stating that “the First Amendment cannot be encroached upon for naught”).
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Buckley 2.0 would evaluate these developments with the benefit of
hindsight. In particular, in addition to applying the doctrines it set forth in
the original Buckley opinion to contemporary electoral practices, it would
have almost a decade of history with which to assess the impact of Citizens
United and SpeechNow.org on those practices. Since the original Buckley
repeatedly used statistics to support its arguments, it is reasonable to assume
that Buckley 2.0 would also consider empirical evidence in reaching its
conclusions today.
2. Buckley 2.0’s Analysis of Unlimited Contributions and the Threat of
Corruption: New Facts on the Ground
There are several areas in which Buckley 2.0 reaches a different conclusion
than the court reached in SpeechNow.org. The first of these is the SpeechNow.org
court’s conclusion that the government’s interest in regulating contributions
to independent spending groups is a “naught” because independent or
uncoordinated spending simply does not pose a threat of corruption or the
appearance of corruption.189
Buckley 2.0 would identify significant problems with this reasoning. As
has been noted by several constitutional law scholars, it does not follow
logically from the fact that groups are themselves engaged in independent
spending—and, thus, may pose no threat of corruption, using the Citizens
United definition—that contributions to these groups by individuals or other
entities also pose no threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption.190
The fallacy, they argue, is the failure to recognize that “[i]t is the six-, seven-,
and eight-figure donations to super PACs that create the appearance (and
likely the reality) of corruption, not the groups’ expenditures” because
ordinary people recognize that office holders reward with legislation or other
favors those who write the large checks, not the recipient groups.191 For
189
190

191

SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 693–95.
See Alschuler et al., supra note 174, at 2308–12 (arguing that “super PAC contributions can corrupt
even when these groups’ expenditures do not” and referencing recent cases in which federal courts
have “rejected the SpeechNow syllogism”).
See id. at 2311–12 (emphasis added). They mention as examples sugar subsidies, tax provisions, and
arms deals that Congress has approved, even when agency staff opposed such acts of favoritism. Id.
They also argue that if the independence of a recipient organization necessarily precluded or
cleansed possible corruption taint associated with donors to independent spending groups, there
would be no reason to have laws barring contributions by government contractors or foreign
persons. Id.; see also Hasen, supra note 174, at 6–10; Alschuler, supra note 174, at 80–82 (arguing
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example, in the eight years after Citizens United was decided, a mere eleven
donors contributed more than $1 billion to Super PACs, which was 20% of
all the money raised by those groups during that time.192 The largest donor
gave almost $78 million to Republican candidates in 2016, which included
$20 million to a single candidate running for President.193
Buckley 2.0 would assess empirically the proposition that contributions to
Super PACs or other independent expenditure groups cannot lead to
corruption or the appearance of corruption by taking into account the
extraordinary size of such contributions. Super PACs, dark money groups
that receive certain earmarked contributions, and section 527 organizations
all are required to disclose the names of their donors and the amounts of their
donations, which then become a matter of public record.194 For example,
the 100 contributors of the largest amounts to outside groups in each election
cycle are listed on OpenSecrets.org.195 Since roughly half of Super PACs in
2015–2016 were single-candidate organizations,196 candidates could easily
know, for example, which individuals or entities each contributed millions of

192

193

194

195

196

that the holding in Caperton is incompatible with saying that the government’s interest in
independent expenditures is zero, even though Justice Kennedy claimed there was a difference
between the two situations).
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, One-Fifth of All Super-PAC Money, from Just Eleven Pockets, WASH. POST, Oct.
27, 2018, at A14; see also supra notes 89–90 (documenting the small number of donors responsible
for two-thirds or more of contributions to Super PACs).
Lee, supra note 192. The constitutional scholars cited above also argue that Citizens United’s claim
that independent spending poses no threat of corruption as a matter of law was actually dictum in
the case, since it was unnecessary to reach a decision in the case after the Court concluded that “the
First Amendment prohibits ‘restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech
by some but not by others.’” Alschuler et al., supra note 174, at 2312–13 (quoting Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010), which was paraphrasing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 784 (1978)). The authors also argue that the Court resolved the case a second time when it
stated that only quid pro quo corruption counts as corruption. Id.
See Jeffrey D. Stanger & Douglas G. Rivlin, Issue Advocacy Advertising During the 1997–1998 Election
Cycle, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR. (1998), http://library.law.columbia.edu/urlmirror/
CLR/100CLR620/report.htm. However, earmarked contributions are rarely reported. See Lee,
supra note 192 (noting that “[w]hile donors to super PACs are disclosed, public filings do not reflect
contributions to politically active nonprofit groups that are not required to reveal their donors.”).
2018 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/out
sidespending/summ.php?cycle=2018&disp=D&type=V&superonly=N (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
The names listed are of individuals. As was noted earlier, the names of groups can be unrevealing
(at least to the public). The OpenSecrets website cautions that the lists are incomplete because most
501(c)(4) groups do not reveal the identities of their donors or the amounts given. Id. The FEC’s
website enables the public to search a candidate’s donors. See Individual Contributions, FEC,
https://www.fec.gov/data/receipts/individual-contributions/?two_year_transaction_period=202
0&min_date=01%2F01%2F2019&max_date=12%2F31%2F2020 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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dollars to support them or defeat their opponents. Even in the case of dark
money groups that do not disclose their donors to the public, candidates are
likely to know which individuals and entities are contributing huge amounts
because, although such groups cannot coordinate their activities with
candidates, no law prohibits them from disclosing to candidates the names of
their donors and the amounts donated, if they choose. Thus, the public is in
the dark; but the beneficiary candidates may not be.
In 2008, the last election before Citizens United was decided, only three
individuals and four entities gave sums in excess of $1 million to outside
groups.197 Regardless of whether the Supreme Court’s claim that
independent spending could pose no threat of corruption was accurate at
that time, the explosion of unlimited spending in the decade after Citizens
United makes that assumption no longer tenable. For example, it is easy to
link one donor’s $20 million contribution to Donald Trump’s campaign to
various actions the Trump Administration has taken that were specifically
requested by that donor.198 Although there is probably no way to prove the
actual impact of huge campaign contributions on a recipient,199 in many
instances the appearance of a connection seems obvious.

197

198

199

2008 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/
outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2008&disp=D&type=V&superonly=N (last visited Apr. 6,
2020) (showing individuals’ funding of outside groups); 2008 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups,
OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2008&disp=D
&type=O&superonly=N (last visited Apr. 6, 2020) (showing organizations’ funding of outside
groups).
See Jeremy W. Peters, Sheldon Adelson Sees a Lot to Like in Trump’s Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/us/politics/adelson-trump-republican-donor.ht
ml. For example, the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and decision to move the U.S.
Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, both urged by Adelson, occurred even before other Trump
campaign promises were acted upon, such as moving forward on building a wall between the
United States and Mexico, which had energized the vast majority of Trump’s most ardent
supporters. The timing suggests that the priority President Trump gave to the two Israel decisions,
if not the inclination to make them in the first place, can be traced to the Adelson’s campaign
contributions and influence. Trump also acted quickly on tax cuts favoring the wealthy over the
middle class, which arguably reflected the influence of large donors to his campaign.
Some argue that those who donate huge sums do so because the candidate already is committed to
the policies the donor favors. See Jake J. Smith, When Corporations Donate to Candidates, Are They Buying
Influence?, KELLOGG INSIGHT (Sept. 5, 2017), https://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/docorporate-campaign-contributions-buy-influence (referencing research on corporate campaign
contributions suggesting “that donations do not buy meaningful political favors”). While
undoubtedly true in some cases, it is hard not to believe that huge campaign contributions will not
affect the priority the recipient assigns to his or her campaign promises. See Hasen, supra note 174,
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In short, when assessing the proposition that independent expenditures
preclude a threat of corruption as a matter of law, Buckley 2.0 would take into
account new facts on the ground, namely, the vast sums injected into
campaigns on an ostensibly independent basis. These are facts that did not
exist in 2010 and that the Justices making that decision may well not have
anticipated. Buckley 2.0 would ask whether at some point what begins as a
matter of degree becomes a matter of kind. Buckley 2.0 would also question
whether the emergence of single-candidate independent expenditure Super
PACs, responsible for almost two-thirds of a billion dollars in the 2015–2016
election cycle alone and accounting for an increasingly large percentage of
total campaign spending, indicates that the formal independence of
expenditures can no longer be presumed to alleviate the threat of corruption.
Finally, focusing specifically on the holding of SpeechNow.org, Buckley 2.0 would
find that nothing in the law prevents the contributors to independent
expenditure groups from coordinating with candidates, even if the groups
themselves cannot.200
3. Buckley 2.0’s Analysis of the Meaning of Corruption and Quid Pro Quo
In addition to reviewing the impact of unlimited giving on the original
Buckley’s assumption that independent spending is unlikely to pose a threat of
corruption, Buckley 2.0 would certainly take issue with the definition of
corruption assumed by SpeechNow.org, based upon Citizens United, i.e., that
corruption refers exclusively to quid pro quo corruption, and not
“[i]ngratiation and access.”201 This interpretation of quid pro quo
corruption, Buckley 2.0 would point out, misstates what the original Buckley
said. When Buckley identified corruption with “political quid pro quo’s,” it cited
as support the opinion of the Court of Appeals below and expressly cited

200

201

at 4 (opining that many large donors seek to ensure a candidate will support measures the donor
desires).
SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694–95; supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text (describing the legal
standard, which depends upon the independence of the recipient organizations and not on any
characteristics of the contributors); infra note 306 and accompanying text (describing an FEC
Advisory Opinion permitting candidates to speak at and solicit contributions at fundraising events
held by independent expenditure entities).
SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 694 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010)). On the
changes in the meaning of corruption in Supreme Court opinions, see Trevor Potter, The Court’s
Changing Concept of Corruption, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (May 7, 2015), https://campaignlegal.org/
update/courts-changing-conception-corruption.
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footnotes in that decision summarizing parts of the record.202 Both the
appellate Buckley opinion and the footnotes cited there characterized quid pro
quo situations in terms of influence as well as bribery. In addition to
describing the problem campaign finance law was addressing as “undue
influence,”203 the appellate court included among illustrative examples large
contributions made “in order to gain a meeting with White House officials”
and testimony that donors were “motivated by the perception that this . . .
would get us in the door and make our point of view heard.”204 To the same
effect, the original Buckley mentions “improper influence,” “undue
influence,” “the “appearance of impropriety,” and “buy[ing] influence”
repeatedly to describe the evils that Congress sought to counter with FECA,
which suggests that the Court saw FECA as addressing problems beyond
bribery or specific trades of money for concrete favors.205 Further, the
original Buckley explicitly rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the law’s
contribution limits were unconstitutional because bribery laws and disclosure
requirements were a less restrictive means of treating quid pro quo
arrangements.206 The Buckley Court countered that “giving and taking of
bribes deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with
money to influence governmental action,”207 implying that “corruption” in
the campaign finance context covers less blatant and specific attempts to
affect official actions and policies.
Buckley 2.0 might also observe that Citizens United appears to understand
corruption as discrete transactions in which contributors exchange donations

202
203
204
205

206
207

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27, n.28 (1976) (per curiam) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d
821, 839–40 & nn. 36–38 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
Buckley, 519 F.2d at 840.
Id. at 840 & nn. 36–37. The footnotes cited by the Buckley Court also mentioned large donors who
saw their contributions as necessary “to be actively considered” for ambassadorships. Id. at n.38.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27, 30, 45, 53, 58, 76; id. at 256–57 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part)
(characterizing the aim of FECA as countering “the risk of undue influence”); id. at 260–61
(referring to the aim of contribution limits as “preventing undue influence” and “improper[]
influence”) (White, J., concurring in part); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 447–52 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part) (four Justice opinion) (describing the history of Supreme Court decisions prior
to Citizens United that understood corruption as including influence and access).
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27–28.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28; see also Alschuler, supra note 174, at 466 (arguing that Buckley’s use of quid
pro quo occurred fifteen years before the Supreme Court first used quid pro quo in a bribery case);
id. at 468–69 (discussing Supreme Court decisions after Buckley that used quid pro quo to cover
situations involving undue influence).
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for specific acts by office holders,208 whereas for the original Buckley, “the
impact of the appearance of corruption stem[s] from public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial
contributions.”209 The notion of “a regime” of large contributions and the
threat of “abuse inherent” in such a regime refers to more than occasional
discrete acts of bribery; it suggests a climate in which the influence of those
who make large contributions is pervasive. Thus, Buckley 2.0 would likely
reject the claims of Citizens United that the “fact that speakers may have
influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials
are corrupt” and that favoritism by representatives is the equivalent of
legitimate responsiveness, not corruption,210 because the Citizens United Court
disregarded the original Buckley opinion and its broader understanding of
corruption.
The original Buckley’s interpretation of the scope of quid pro quo
corruption is consistent with, indeed part and parcel of, the original Buckley’s
concern with preserving “the integrity of our system of representative
democracy.”211 For the initial Buckley, corruption was problematic because
it threatened the integrity of representative government. Eliminating
corruption was thus a means to a more foundational end, the integrity of the
electoral system that ensures that the U.S. government will be truly
representative. In fact, Buckley 2.0 might well diagnose the main error of
Citizens United as the later Court’s attempt to reduce Buckley’s focus on the
integrity of the American electoral system to a single threat to its integrity,
namely, quid pro quo corruption, and a narrow version of quid pro quo
corruption at that. The original Buckley had a much broader view of potential
threats to the government’s integrity. If integrity is the end, and elimination
of corruption is a means, then curbing the influence of big contributions on
the decision-making of public officials is a compelling interest because their
decisions should be guided by some vision of the public interest and
deliberation.
In sum, Buckley 2.0 would find that Citizens United could not legitimately
cite Buckley as the basis for its holding because quid pro quo meant something
208
209
210

211

See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359–61 (distinguishing quid pro quo corruption from ingratiation
and favoritism, which it equates with responsiveness to constituents).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359. Citizens United quotes Justice Kennedy’s opinion in McConnell as
well, id., but fails to note that Justice Kennedy was concurring in part with the decision’s holding
and with its reasoning. The portion quoted forms part of Justice Kennedy’s disagreement with the
McConnell majority.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27.

May 2020]

BUCKLEY 2.0

733

more expansive for Buckley than the meaning adopted by Citizens United. Had
Citizens United recognized that the actual meaning of quid pro quo for the
Buckley Court included influence or access, it would have confronted two
choices. Either it would have acknowledged the need to overturn this aspect
of Buckley explicitly, or alternatively, it would have realized the necessity of
providing an independent justification for its claim that giving access and
influence cannot constitute corruption as a matter of law, based upon
considerations other than precedent.212 Absent such a justification or explicit
rejection of Buckley, Citizens United’s claim about the meaning of quid pro quo
has no foundation other than an interpretive mistake. Buckley 2.0 would thus
reject this aspect of Citizens United, which, in turn, would further weaken the
claim that independent expenditures cannot pose a threat of corruption as a
matter of law.
4. Buckley 2.0’s Analysis of the Appearance of Corruption
Justice Kennedy stated in Citizens United that “[t]he appearance of
influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in
our democracy.”213 His support for his assertion is the further assertion that
“ingratiation and access . . . are not corruption” as a matter of law214 and the
dictum that “it is our law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the
governing rule.”215
Buckley 2.0 would observe that when the original Buckley stated that the
appearance of corruption is “of almost equal concern” as the actuality of
corruption, it immediately linked the appearance of corruption to “public
awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large

212

213
214

215

The Citizens United majority did rely on other precedents, but they were dissents in decisions where
the majority opinion construed quid pro quo more broadly. There were numerous precedents in
majority opinions, in contrast, supporting the Buckley majority’s view. See Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 447-51 (Stevens, J.) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46).
Justice Kennedy adds that the fact that corporations make independent expenditures itself
acknowledges “the ultimate influence” of voters. Id. Justice Kennedy’s comment does not prove
what he thinks it does. The fact that donors fund independent expenditures to get a candidate
elected or re-elected is wholly consistent with the donors’ hope that the candidate, once elected,
will be grateful and thus influenced in his agenda or official actions by the donors’ wishes.
Candidates, in turn, want to continue to inspire their large donors’ generosity in future elections
and, thus, have an additional reason to please them while in office.
Id. at 361.
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individual financial contributions.”216 The original Buckley reasoned that
“Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance
of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of
representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’”217
The original Buckley thus agreed with Citizens United that preserving citizens’
trust or faith in their government is the underlying issue, but it disagreed with
the latter decision about what causes citizens to lose trust or confidence in
government. Further, the original Buckley specifically identified “the
appearance of improper influence” as a significant threat to confidence in
representative democracy justifying certain campaign finance regulations.218
These statements are evidence that the original Buckley interpreted the
appearance of corruption to include an ordinary person’s predictable
reaction to oversize contributions, i.e., that they would influence, even if they
did not completely determine, a recipient’s decision-making.
In addition, the Buckley approach reflects FECA’s legislative history, in
which lawmakers expressly linked contribution limits to the problem of
influence and indebtedness, not just to bargains struck.219 Although Citizens
United also recognized that the touchstone of the integrity of government is
citizens’ trust in the system,220 the Court seemed to assume that the
appearance of corruption is inextricably connected to bribery—as, in its
view, corruption is—as though public impressions of the influence of wealth
on the agendas and attitudes of lawmakers short of bribery were of no legal
consequence for the question of appearances.
In point of fact, empirical analysis shows otherwise. Buckley 2.0 would
bolster its interpretation of the original Buckley by citing numerous studies
showing that ordinary citizens equate gaining influence or buying access with
corruption.221 It is thus consistent with both the Supreme Court’s own
216
217
218
219

220
221

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27; see also supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFLCIO, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 291 (1971) (statement of Sen. Chiles) (emphasizing the need for measures
to “restore public confidence” in “the elective process”); Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commc’ns of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong. 542 (1971) (statement of Sen.
Frank E. Moss) (noting the “widespread cynicism” traceable to the “vast influence” of big
contributors).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
See, e.g., Liz Kennedy, Citizens Actually United: The Overwhelming Bi-Partisan Opposition to Corporate
Political Spending and Support for Achievable Reforms, DEMOS (Oct. 25, 2012), https://www.dem
os.org/policy-briefs/citizens-actually-united-bi-partisan-opposition-corporate-political-spending-a
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precedents and empirical data to have a capacious definition of corruption
in “the appearance of corruption,” even if corruption per se is construed
narrowly. In short, the question of appearances cannot be decided as a
matter of law.222 Thus, even if Buckley 2.0 did not contest Citizens United’s
definition of corruption, it would likely reject that Court’s narrow definition
of the appearance of corruption when evaluating Congress’s attempt to enact
reforms addressing threats to citizens’ trust in government owing to the
appearance of corruption.
Buckley 2.0’s likely conclusion concerning the appearance of corruption
can be traced to the specific concern articulated by Buckley and subsequent
decisions, namely, that people’s “confidence in the system of representative
[g]overnment,” i.e., the “integrity of our system,” will be undermined by
seeing large contributors obtaining special access to or favors from public
officials.223
Although some commentators have argued that large
contributions are more often motivated by candidates’ policies than the
reverse,224 the vast majority of ordinary voters see large donations as
corrupting influences because they assume that large contributors have a
disproportionate voice over legislation and public policies.225 Representative
government, in contrast to other forms of democracy, presupposes the

222
223
224
225

nd (finding that 85% “call it corruption when financial supporters have more access and influence
with members of Congress than average Americans”); Christopher Robertson et al., The Appearance
and the Reality of Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An Empirical Investigation, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 375 (2016)
(finding support, based upon a simulated grand jury and a representative online petit jury, for the
position that contributions intended to influence a public official to support favorable legislation
creates the appearance of corruption, even though the contributions are made to an independent
entity that supports the official’s reelection); Molly J. Walker Wilson, Financing Elections and
“Appearance of Corruption”: Citizen Attitudes and Behavior, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 953, 980 (2014) (citing
survey data); see also Ben Jacobs & David Smith, ‘Politics Are Corrupt’: Fears About Money and its Influence
on Elections Loom Large, GUARDIAN (Jul. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2016/jul/08/trump-clinton-sanders-super-pacs-election-money (noting that in the months leading
up to the 2016 presidential elections, individuals “raised [the issue of campaign finance reform] as
one of their main concerns”); William Alan Nelson II, Buying the Electorate: An Empirical Study of the
Current Campaign Finance Landscape and How the Supreme Court Erred in Not Revisiting Citizens United, 61
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 443, 463–64 (2013) (citing multiple polls from 2010 in which a large majority
of respondents agreed “that there should be limits on corporate political spending” and expressed
opposition to the Citizens United decision); Rebecca L. Brown & Andrew D. Martin, Rhetoric and
Reality: Testing the Harm of Campaign Spending, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1066, 1071–72 (2015) (describing
how “large infusions of money into campaigns have the effect of causing the electorate to lose faith”
in their representatives).
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27.
See, e.g., supra note 199 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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responsiveness of lawmakers to citizens in general, and not just to elites or
interest groups. Although no individual or group can expect that its views
will necessarily carry the day and be translated into government action, it is
reasonable for them to believe that their views will be taken seriously and
receive meaningful consideration and that the wishes of the majority of
citizens will not be routinely disregarded in favor of the agendas of large
contributors. If, ex ante, the views of donors of huge sums of money will
determine legislative outcomes and executive actions, the resulting system
does not deserve the label “representative.” In short, Buckley 2.0 would justify
its interpretation on the perceptions of ordinary citizens because the original
Buckley and the concept of representative democracy both require this. It
would thus reject Citizens United’s narrowing of the “appearance of
corruption” for purposes of constitutional analysis both because it contradicts
the original Buckley and because it ignores the necessarily experiential basis
of what constitutes appearances.
5. Buckley 2.0’s Analysis of the Independence of Contemporary Independent
Expenditures
Citizens United invalidated existing statutory restrictions on corporate
spending using general business revenues in situations where corporations
are engaged in independent spending.226 In contrast, if their ostensibly
independent spending is in fact coordinated with a candidate or a candidate’s
campaign, Citizens United left unchanged the FECA provision that recharacterizes the amounts involved as contributions to a candidate and, thus,
makes them subject to contribution limits.227
The original Buckley, which protected independent expenditures from
limits enacted by Congress in 1971, involved independent spending by
individuals or groups. As stated by the original Buckley, the reason Congress
cannot constitutionally limit the amounts spent on independent expenditures
is that such spending does not pose a threat of corruption because such
spending is not controlled by a candidate and, thus, might be used in ways
viewed by the candidate as unhelpful or even harmful.228 As a consequence,

226
227

228

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365. Parallel rules apply to unions. See supra note 32.
See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B) (2018) (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)); Buckley, 424 U.S. at
46; 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(b) (2019). For the limited effectiveness of this rule, see infra notes 232–44
and accompanying text.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
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the candidate would not necessarily feel indebted to or under an obligation
to please the persons responsible for independent spending.
In taking this position, the Buckley Court was not naive; it conditioned its
holding on the independent spending being “totally” independent.229
Otherwise the inference from the candidate’s lack of control and potential
for harm would not be warranted. Further, it noted that independent
spending did “not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent
corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign
contributions,”230 thereby making clear that the Court did not rule out, as a
matter of law or otherwise, the possibility that independent spending could
at some time pose such a threat. For Buckley, independent spending was to
be protected because of “its substantially diminished potential for abuse.”231
The task for Buckley 2.0, therefore, is to examine whether the threat posed by
independent spending as practiced in the current environment is as
diminished as it was in 1976 or, in the alternative, independent spending now
poses a threat of abuse. Depending upon the result, Buckley 2.0’s inquiry
could affect independent spending by individuals as well as by corporations
and other business interests, with ramifications for the constitutional status of
unlimited contributions to independent expenditure groups as well.
FECA does not define “independent” or its opposite, “coordinated”;
rather the terms are defined in FECA regulations.232 Initially, the FEC’s
implementing regulations defined coordination in terms of a candidate
engaging in “substantial discussion or negotiation” with a third party that
resulted in “collaboration or agreement.”233 In 2001, Congress rejected that
interpretation as too weak, and it directed the FEC to promulgate regulations
covering a much wider range of interactions between candidates and third
parties supporting their campaigns with allegedly independent spending.234

229
230
231
232

233
234

Id.
Id. at 46. Cf. Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 246 (2010) (arguing that
Buckley adopted the absurd view that “independent expenditures are not at all” corrupting).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
11 C.F.R. § 109.20(a) (2019) (defining “coordinated” as “cooperation, consultation or concert with,
or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, or a political
party committee”).
Shays v. FEC (Shays I), 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 55–56 & n.25 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(B)(ii) (2018); Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No.107155, § 214(c), 116 Stat. 81, 94 (2002).
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The resulting new coordination regulations were successfully challenged in
court twice for being too permissive to satisfy the Congressional mandate.235
That the current regulations are still too permissive has been noted by
reformers and members of both political parties because they do not classify
as “coordinated” many communications that would be considered
coordinated “under any common sense definition.”236 Some aspects of the
definition are vague. For example, communications made by an individual
or group may only be considered coordinated if a candidate or staff member
is “materially involved in decisions regarding the communications,”237 with
uncertain application of standards to determine materiality.238 In addition,
the rules themselves are often lax: they permit independent expenditure
entities to hire the same vendors, such as pollsters and advertising companies,
as the candidate uses, as long as a “firewall” is created between those in the
company representing the candidate and those representing the independent
expenditure entity.239 Moreover, a firewall is not necessarily mandatory: the
FEC approved an exempt organization with both a traditional PAC and an
235
236

237
238

239

The history of this litigation is described in Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 918–22 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
See Campaign Legal Center & Democracy 21, Comment Letter on Commission’s Notice 2014-12
on Earmarking, Affiliation, Joint Fundraising, Disclosure, and Other Issues (McCutcheon), at 19 (Jan.
15, 2015), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=312983; see also, e.g., Brent Ferguson,
Beyond Coordination: Defining Indirect Campaign Contributions for the Super PAC Era, 42 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 471, 524 (2015) (describing the nature of indirect contributions and the difficulty in defining
them “given the lack of direct guidance from the Supreme Court”); see also Bradley A. Smith, Super
PACs and the Role of “Coordination” in Campaign Finance Law, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 603, 605–06
(2013) (quoting but disagreeing with lawmakers, academics, and party officials who deny the
independence of independent entities like Super PACs); Public Citizen, Comment Letter on Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking 2010-01 on Coordinated Communications, at 4 (Feb. 24, 2010),
https://www.fec.gov/resources/legal-resources/rulemakings/nprm/coord_commun/2009/publ
ic_citizen.pdf (stating that there are “crippling weaknesses inherent in the 2007 coordination rule”).
11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(2), (3) (2019). If the information in question was obtained from a publicly
available source, however, coordination has not occurred. Id. § 109.21(d)(3).
According to the FEC, “‘material’ has its ordinary legal meaning, which is ‘important; more or less
necessary; having influence or effect; going to the merits.’ . . . The term ‘material’ is included to
safeguard against the inclusion of incidental participation that is not important to, or does not
influence, decisions regarding a communication.” Material Involvement, 68 Fed. Reg. 434 (Jan. 3,
2003) (codified at 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(2)) (citing Material, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.
1990)).
11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(4), (5) (2019); see also Ashley Balcerzak, Candidates and Their Super PACs Sharing
Vendors More Than Ever, OPENSECRETS (Dec. 21, 2016, 3:25 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/
news/2016/12/candidates-super-pacs-share-vendors/; Idrees Kahloon, Outside Groups, Presidential
Committees Share Staff and Vendors, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Aug. 7, 2015, 12:01 AM),
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2015/08/07/super-pacs-presidential-committees-share-staff-and
-vendors/; Note, Working Together for An Independent Expenditure: Candidate Assistance with Super PAC
Fundraising, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1478, 1485–86 (2015).
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independent expenditure Super PAC, even though the same individual was
President of the exempt organization and Treasurer of both PACs, based
upon the organization’s simple representation to the FEC that the Super
PAC would not engage in any coordinated activities.240 Further, not
infrequently, a member of a lawmaker’s staff resigns from his or her staff
position before an election and then establishes and operates an independent
expenditure entity, even a single-candidate Super PAC, to help elect or reelect the lawmaker,241 bringing along a reservoir of inside information. One
commentator has opined that a candidate’s spouse can buy advertising
urging the election of the candidate without violating the coordination rules
as long as they do not “discuss[] the details of specific ad buys.”242 Again,
communications made in public are exempted from the definition of
coordination, so candidates or their surrogates can, for example, state openly
when interviewed on radio or television a campaign’s “wish list” for
additional advertising or get-out-the-vote efforts in specific locations.243 For
these and other reasons, the coordination rules have been repeatedly
criticized for failing to ensure genuine independence. The lack of

240

241

242

243

FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 2010-09, at 4 (2010), available at https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/
aos/2010-09/AO-2010-09.pdf (finding that the President’s “overlap of duties” would not
“compromise” the Super PAC’s independence because of the representations made by the
organization).
For specific examples, see Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
88, 90–91 (2013); see also FEC, ADVISORY OPINION 2016-21, at 3–7 (2017), available at
https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2016-21/2016-21.pdf (discussing several situations in which
a candidate’s or party’s former employee joins a hybrid PAC and concluding that the use of
information acquired in previous position will be coordinated if it is material).
Paul S. Ryan, Two Faulty Assumptions of Citizens United and How to Limit the Damage, 44 U. TOL. L.
REV. 583, 586 (2013). Although the quoted statement may be an exaggeration, because the
standard would be the materiality of the information transmitted, not specificity, nonetheless the
less specific the information in question, the harder it would be to prove its materiality.
See, e.g., Alex Roarty et al., They’re Not Allowed to Talk. But Candidates and PACs Are Brazenly
Communicating All the Time, ATLANTIC (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/po
litics/archive/2014/10/theyre-not-allowed-to-talk-but-candidates-and-pacs-are-brazenly-commu
nicating-all-the-time/435771/; Briffault, supra note 241, at 94. Cf. Kenneth P. Doyle, FEC Drops
Illegal Coordination Charges Against McGinty Campaign, BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 19, 2016, 3:34 PM)
(describing FEC’s decision to drop coordination charges against a Pennsylvania Senate candidate).
But see Complaint, Campaign Legal Center v. VoteVets (F.E.C. filed Feb. 18, 2020), available at
https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/02-18-20%20VoteVets%20Buttigieg%20
%28final%20signed%29.pdf (arguing that there is no public communication exception if the public
communications were at the request or suggestion of the candidate or his campaign).
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enforcement also contributes to the problem, and the FEC has rarely found
an ostensibly independent activity to be coordinated.244
In light of these provisions and practices, Buckley 2.0 would conclude that
what satisfies the legal definition of independence is not in fact “totally”
independent as originally understood by Buckley in 1976. Such a finding
would force Buckley 2.0 to assess, first, whether the absence of meaningful
independence today is a sufficient reason for reversing Citizens United’s
decision to allow corporations to fund independent spending with general
treasury revenues and, second, whether SpeechNow.org’s extension of that
ruling to contributions to independent spending groups remains valid. These
questions are examined in the next Part.
III. WOULD THE BUCKLEY COURT OVERRULE CITIZENS UNITED AND
SPEECHNOW.ORG?
Buckley 2.0 will thus be forced to consider whether the time has come to
overrule Citizens United, which will have the concomitant effect of invalidating
SpeechNow.org insofar as it relies on the reasoning of Citizens United regarding
the relationship between independent expenditures and corruption.
A. Principles Governing the Protection of Speech During Elections
In contemplating such a consequential action, Buckley 2.0 would first
review the principles grounding the original Buckley decision. These are that:
1.
2.
3.

244

245
246

247

The First Amendment affords a very high degree of protection to both
political expression and political association.245
Neither of these protected rights is absolute. As stated in the original
Buckley, “[e]ven a ‘significant interference’ with protected rights of
political association” may at times be justified. 246
Government restrictions on these rights must be subject to exacting
scrutiny.247

See Rachael Marcus & John Dunbar, Rules Against Coordination Between Super PACs, Candidates, Tough
to Enforce, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), https://public
integrity.org/federal-politics/rules-against-coordination-between-super-pacs-candidates-tough-toenforce (relating criticism of current enforcement of coordination rules).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 25 (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 413 U.S.
548, 567 (1973)) (“Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is
absolute”).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16. Buckley uses the standard of “exacting scrutiny” in connection with limits
on independent expenditures, id. at 44–45, and disclosure regulations. Id. at 64. Buckley adopts
“the closest scrutiny” when upholding contribution limits. Id. at 25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama,
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Exacting scrutiny requires the Court to assess the importance of the
government’s interest in regulating campaign speech and the
relationship between the government’s interest and the means chosen to
effectuate that interest.248
The interest of the government in regulating campaign contributions is
primarily to prevent corruption of candidates and office holders deriving
from the influence of large outlays because corruption undermines the
integrity of the system of representative government.249
The interest of the government in regulating campaign contributions is
also to prevent the appearance of corruption in the eyes of the citizens
because confidence in elected officials’ integrity when acting in their
official capacity is also essential to the integrity of the system of
representative government and a primary goal.250
Although preventing corruption and its appearance are the primary
justifications for FECA’s restrictions on campaign contributions,
nothing in the original Buckley precludes Congress taking additional
steps to protect the integrity of the system of representative government
if they satisfy exacting scrutiny.251 For example, electoral integrity also
depends upon an informed electorate. 252 Both the protection of political
speech and disclosure rules are justified for the sake of facilitating an
informed electorate.
The ability of candidates to have sufficient resources for effective
advocacy is another condition of the integrity of representative
government and, thus, the means that governments select to address
corruption, its appearance, an informed electorate, confidence in
elected officials, or other conditions of the integrity of representative
government should not obstruct the possibility of effective advocacy by
candidates for election or re-election.253
It is inconsistent with the First Amendment to restrict the speech of some
to assure that citizens at large have equal resources to make their voices
heard.254

Buckley 2.0 would then examine, in light of these principles and current
campaign practices, the reasoning presented in Citizens United to justify its

248
249
250
251
252
253
254

357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958)) (“In view of the fundamental nature of the right to associate,
governmental ‘action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to
the closest scrutiny.”).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64–65.
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 25–26; see also id. at 67.
Id. 14–15, 49 n.55; see also id. at 26 (referring to corruption and its appearance as FECA’s primary
purpose, not its exclusive purpose); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68 (referring to Congress’ goals of “curbing the evils of campaign ignorance
and corruption”).
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 48–49.
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conclusion that it is unconstitutional to prevent corporations and unions from
using general treasury funds for advocating the election or defeat of
candidates when these entities do not coordinate with candidates or their
campaigns.
B. Citizens United’s Claim that Corporations Have General Political Speech Rights
1. Buckley’s Silence Concerning Corporate and Union Rights
Citizens United asserted that the restrictions on corporations and unions
spending general treasury funds “could not have been squared with the
reasoning of [Buckley],”255 based largely on inferences Citizens United drew
from what Buckley failed to say. For example, according to Citizens United,
when Buckley invalidated FECA’s limits on independent expenditures, it did
not make an exception for corporations and unions engaging in independent
spending; therefore, Buckley must have assumed these entities would be
making independent expenditures along with individuals and other groups
and, thus, it must have implicitly approved such activities.256
As a matter of logic, however, a court’s silence on a subject does not in
general show that it endorses every possible inference based upon what it did
not address in a decision. This is especially true in a system such as ours,
where judges are limited to adjudicating cases or controversies.257 Buckley 2.0
would explain that, as Citizens United itself noted,258 FECA’s prohibition on
corporate and union independent expenditures financed through general
treasury funds was not an issue in the original Buckley. Buckley 2.0 would reject
Citizens United’s assertion of Buckley’s implicit teaching because the Court was
not asked to nor did it consider the application of independent expenditure
rules to commercial corporations and unions. Thus, Buckley’s conclusion that
independent expenditures “do[] not presently appear to pose dangers of real
or apparent corruption” like large contributions do was reached without
evidence presented as to the impact of campaign spending by commercial
corporations or unions.259
Second, Citizens United supported its claim as to Buckley’s implicit teaching
by observing that “some of the prevailing plaintiffs in Buckley were
255
256
257
258
259

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 346 (2010).
Id. at 346.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46.
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corporations.”260 Buckley 2.0 would respond that the corporate plaintiffs in
the original Buckley were “political committees” under FECA or nonprofit
advocacy organizations like the New York Civil Liberties Union.261 Buckley
2.0 would note that political committees were already subject to FECA’s
fundraising and disclosure rules, so they could not use treasury funds for
political spending anyway. The other corporate plaintiffs in the case were
advocacy organizations, not commercial enterprises, so their sources of funds
were largely donations or dues, not business revenues.
Buckley 2.0 would thus conclude that the original Buckley had not
examined the question of independent expenditures made by corporations
or unions from their general treasury funds. Accordingly, Citizens United’s
inferences from its silence or from the fact that some plaintiffs were
corporations did not support Citizens United’s conclusion that Buckley was
precedent for the proposition that commercial corporations and unions have
general political speech rights.
2. Citizens United’s Argument Based Upon Bellotti
Citizens United asserted that Buckley stood for the “principle that the
Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate
identity.”262 It buttressed this claim by turning to First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, which invalidated a state ban on corporations funding independent
expenditures.263 Bellotti considered a Massachusetts statute banning
contributions or expenditures by corporations and other business entities
during a ballot initiative relating to a state-sponsored proposal to introduce
a graduated income tax. The Bellotti Court emphasized that the challenged
statute threatened to prevent the airing of a point of view that might not
otherwise be represented during the debate over the proposed legislation, in
particular, the viewpoint of business interests opposed to Massachusetts’
position endorsing the ballot initiative.264 In expressing its concern about the
260
261
262
263
264

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346.
According to Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7–8, the plaintiffs were three individuals and seven organizations.
The organizations were political parties, nonprofits, and advocacy groups. Id.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346.
Id. at 340 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978).
The Court thus seems to have viewed this as a case of viewpoint discrimination, because the
Government sought to silence the view of business entities who opposed the state’s proposed tax
reform. But see Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 347 (asserting that Bellotti was not about viewpoint
discrimination).
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government using its legislative power to suppress opposition to its position,
the Bellotti Court said that the First Amendment does not permit the
government to prevent a class of speakers from contributing to the discussion
of a public issue.265
In reviewing Citizens United’s reliance upon Bellotti for the proposition that
the First Amendment categorically bars the government from preventing a
class of speakers from engaging in political speech, Buckley 2.0 would observe
that neither the Bellotti holding nor its reasoning claimed to invalidate
regulation of corporate political speech as a general matter. Rather, the
Bellotti Court explicitly distinguished the government’s interest in preventing
corruption in a ballot initiative from other situations, noting that its
“consideration of a corporation’s right to speak on issues of general public
interest implies no comparable right in the quite different context of participation
in a political campaign for election to public office.”266 The Bellotti Court
reiterated that the “risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate
elections . . . simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue[]”267 to
be decided by a referendum. Because of Bellotti’s express distinction between
discussion of issues in the context of a referendum, on the one hand, and
promoting candidates for election, on the other, Buckley 2.0 would find that
Bellotti does not stand for a general constitutional bar to singling out
corporations with respect to speech in the elections of candidates or a
presumptive right of corporate political speech outside the referendum
context.
3. Citizens United’s Argument Based Upon MCFL
Buckley 2.0 would find Citizens United’s reliance upon FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life (MCFL)268 similarly misplaced. MCFL was an educational and
advocacy nonprofit corporation devoted to promoting human life that, by
virtue of being a corporation, was prevented by the federal prohibition from
spending its general treasury funds on political advocacy.269 The MCFL

265
266

267
268
269

Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784–85.
Id. at 788 n.26 (emphasis added). Citizens United dismissed reliance on the Court’s statement because
it was in a footnote. However, the issue of spending by corporations in an election of candidates
was not before the Court. In any event, the Bellotti Court also distinguished ballot measures from
candidate elections in the text of its decision. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790.
FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
Id. at 242 n.1.
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Court went to great lengths to distinguish the nonprofit corporation in MCFL
from commercial corporations. It noted that MCFL was a small nonstock
corporation that itself engaged in no commercial activities and, further,
accepted no money from business entities or unions.270 Indeed, it raised
money from contributions from individuals and from garage sales, bake sales,
dances, raffles, and picnics.271 The Court emphasized how burdensome
requiring a small and unsophisticated nonprofit to establish a PAC would be,
given the FECA regulations applying to PACs.272
Despite the MCFL Court’s restriction of its holding to these facts, Citizens
United cited the administrative burdens catalogued in MCFL as evidence that
requiring corporations and unions of any size to fund express advocacy with
PAC money would be unconstitutionally burdensome. Accordingly, Citizens
United cited MCFL as precedent for an absolute prohibition against limiting
corporations and unions from engaging in political speech paid for by
treasury funds.273
In reviewing Citizens United’s argument, Buckley 2.0 would note that MCFL
expressed concerns about the influence of corporate wealth on campaigns274
and that it explicitly distinguished that situation of commercial corporations
from “this fund.”275 Thus, in MCFL the Supreme Court concluded that the
difference between MCFL and commercial corporations was one of kind and
not merely degree.276 For these reasons, and because MCFL expressly
asserted that the situation of commercial corporations was a “question not
before us,”277 Buckley 2.0 would find the analogy between MCFL-type
corporations and commercial ones untenable. It would thus conclude that
MCFL cannot be used as precedent for equating the speech rights of all
corporations of whatever size and purpose from a First Amendment
perspective nor as support for Citizens United’s absolutist position regarding
the regulation of corporate political speech.

270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277

Id. at 241–42.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 253–55. Even so, the Court concluded that the burdens were not “insurmountable,” and
thus actually rested its holding on the lack of a compelling government interest. Id. at 263.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 338 (2010).
Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 257–60.
Id. at 258 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 263.
Id.; see also id. at 263–64 (outlining three features of the facts in Mass. Citizens for Life that support the
Court’s holding, none of which is true of commercial corporations).
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In sum, Buckley 2.0 would find that Citizens United leaped without
justification from language about a ballot initiative in Bellotti and a small
nonprofit advocacy organization funded by individual donations in MCFL to
its assertion of general political speech rights for corporations of whatever
size and nature when intervening in a campaign for public office.
C. Citizens United’s Inferences from Corporations’ and Unions’ General Political
Speech Rights
In addition to rejecting Citizens United’s arguments underlying its assertion
of general political speech rights for corporations based upon Supreme Court
precedents, Buckley 2.0 would also question Citizens United’s subsequent
argument that, because corporations in general have the same right to
political expression as other speakers, it would be unconstitutional to restrict
their use of their own resources (including general treasury funds) unless the
government could show that such restrictions are necessary to avoid the
threat of corruption or its appearance.
When the Citizens United Court asserted that such a showing is impossible
as a matter of law if corporations are not coordinating with candidates, it
relied upon the original Buckley’s statement that uncoordinated spending at
that time did not appear to pose a risk of corruption or its appearance.278
The original Buckley’s statement seems to have referred to independent
spending by individuals (singly), non-corporate groups or associations, or
advocacy groups.279 Citizens United then concluded that the same reasoning
would apply equally to commercial corporations or unions acting
independently of candidates and, thus, that the existing ban on such entities
using treasury funds was a violation of the First Amendment’s protection of
the presumptive political speech rights of corporations.
For reasons discussed in Part II, Buckley 2.0 would have several grounds
for rejecting this aspect of the reasoning of Citizens United. First, as noted
above,280 Citizens United’s conclusion depended upon a narrow interpretation
of quid pro quo as bribery or a concrete exchange between the person
making the expenditure and a candidate or public official, which would be
impossible if the parties acted independently of one another. Buckley 2.0, in
contrast, pointed out that the original Buckley’s understanding of quid pro quo
was broader and included such things as influencing a candidate as well as
278
279
280

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46 (1976) (per curiam).
See supra note 261.
See supra Part II.B.3.

May 2020]

BUCKLEY 2.0

747

obtaining access, and not exclusively outright bribery. Citizens United’s
misreading of this aspect of the original Buckley was significant because
independent spending is not inherently inconsistent with the independent
spender having influence on candidates, who are aware of the identity of
those who make outsize expenditures, even in those instances when their
identities are hidden from the public.
Second, Buckley 2.0 also concluded that the appearance of corruption
could arise when big contributors influence or gain access to candidates and
elected officials, since these signal corruption to ordinary citizens, as they did
to those who enacted FECA.281 Buckley 2.0 reinforced the original Buckley’s
observation with contemporary survey data linking people’s perception of
the influence of money on officials with their distrust of government.282 Its
conclusion was further strengthened by the proliferation of dark money
groups to which business interests and wealthy individuals can contribute
unlimited sums without public knowledge of the donors’ identities despite the
likelihood that candidates know their identities and will be influenced by such
spending.283
Third, the original Buckley claimed that independent spending poses no
threat of corruption or its appearance only if the spending is totally
independent.284 After reviewing current campaign finance regulations and
practices, Buckley 2.0 concluded that conformity with the legal test for
independence does not guarantee total independence so as to preclude
concrete exchanges between contributors and representatives, influence, or
access.285 Among other things, Buckley 2.0 saw the importance of the
emergence and rapid increase of single-candidate Super PACS staffed by
former staff or associates of a candidate and permitted to raise money with
the active assistance of the candidate.286 Moreover, Buckley 2.0 would note
that the original Buckley assumed there would be disclosure to counter the risk
of corruption; increasingly, however, campaign spending employs nondisclosing vehicles, uses non-revealing contributor names, or engages in other
281
282
283

284
285
286

See supra notes 216–19 and accompanying text.
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C (noting that the amount of money involved cannot be quantified because of the
absence of disclosure); see also supra notes 52–64 (discussing the reasons for the lack of disclosure
pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code and FECA).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam).
See supra Part II.B.5.
See supra notes 107, 241, 306 and accompanying text.
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strategies to prevent voters from knowing who is responsible for campaign
messages.287 Buckley 2.0 would thus conclude that in contrast to the situation
in 1976, independent spending does in fact “presently appear to pose dangers
of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large
campaign contributions.”288
Buckley 2.0 would also consider the burden on corporate and union
political speech that would result from overruling Citizens United in light of the
empirical data discussed in Part I. In particular, it would note that spending
by business interests during the 2016 election cycle was eight-and-a-half
times more than in the 1976 cycle (in inflation-adjusted dollars) without taking
into account new spending vehicles made possible by Citizens United.289 In
addition, business interests would continue to be able to spend general
treasury funds on issue advocacy in general, as well as on communications
mentioning candidates for public office on the eve of an election, as long as
they are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy.290 Buckley 2.0
would thus conclude that the burden on corporate and union speech—if they
lacked the opportunities for spending resulting from the holding in Citizens
United—would not be severe because of the many avenues that would remain
for these entities to spend enormous sums on campaigns and to participate
in the discussion of candidates and issues raised by candidates during
elections. At the same time, Buckley 2.0 would find that the risk of corruption
from such spending would be far greater than in 1976 because the original
Buckley assumed there would be disclosure to counter the risk of corruption291
and because of the rate of increase of business spending in elections in recent
decades. Buckley 2.0 would thus find that Citizens United should be overruled
because the flaws in its reasoning rendered it inconsistent with the original
Buckley, upon which it claimed to be based; political speech by business
interests would continue to enjoy vast amounts of funding; and the threat of
corruption posed by aggregate campaign spending by such interests in the
wake of Citizens United has increased greatly due to the spike in contributions
of millions of dollars.

287
288
289
290
291

See supra notes 53–55, 58–68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 181, 230 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.1.
See supra Part I.D.
See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60–84 (1976) (per curiam).
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D. SpeechNow.org and Buckley 2.0’s Analysis of Unlimited Contributions to
Independent Spending Groups
If Buckley 2.0 rejects Citizens United’s claims about the speech rights of
corporations, the nature of quid pro quo arrangements, and the implications
of FECA’s independence standard as a matter of law, the holding of
SpeechNow.org will not survive because of its dependence on these doctrines.
Even if Buckley 2.0 did not invalidate the central teaching of Citizens United,
however, it would likely find the later case’s extension of the earlier decision
illegitimate.
The original justification for immunizing independent expenditures from
dollar limits was twofold. As stated earlier, the main justification was that,
because such expenditures were unlikely to pose a significant threat of
corruption and the limits proposed by Congress would impose a “direct and
substantial” burden on core political speech,292 the government interest in
imposing the statutory limits on individual expenditures was not compelling
enough to overcome the protection afforded by the First Amendment. A
second and related reason advanced by the original Buckley was that, because
the dollar limits would only apply to communications advocating the election
or defeat of candidates for federal office,293 they would prohibit only a small
subset of political communications that could pose a risk of corruption,
thereby accomplishing “no substantial societal interest.”294
Buckley 2.0 would evaluate the constitutionality of limiting contributions
to independent expenditure entities in light of the original Buckley’s analysis
of contributions and independent expenditures as well as developments in
campaign finance law and practices since then. It would begin by reviewing

292

293

294

As enacted in 1971, FECA imposed a $1000 cap on expenditures by individuals to support any
specific candidate per year. Id. at 13. There was also an overall annual maximum of $25,000. The
overall limit was invalidated in McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 204 (2014).
As originally enacted, FECA limits would also have applied to all speech “relative to a clearly
defined candidate” and thus, would have applied to a wide range of campaign communications.
However, the Court held that “relative to” was too vague to withstand First Amendment scrutiny
because the limitation might be imposed on discussions of issues and legislative proposals. The
Court thus invalidated the original provision except as it applied to words of express advocacy. See
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39–44.
Id. at 45.
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empirical evidence regarding the nature and extent of spending by these
entities and the role of unlimited contributions in funding them.
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

6.

In the 2015–2016 election cycle, more than a fifth of the total (reported)
election spending of $6.5 billion was traceable to independent
expenditure groups, with Super PACs responsible for more than $1
billion of this amount.295 Unreported spending by outside groups,
including issue advocacy calculated to influence the election of specific
candidates but not subject to reporting, cannot be estimated, but clearly
added hundreds of millions of dollars to these totals. 296
The amount of identifiable outside spending in the 2015–2016 election
cycle represented an increase of almost 50% over the comparable
amount in the previous presidential election cycle.297
The massive nature of such spending was not an aberration. In fact,
because Donald Trump received an unusual amount of free publicity,
experts believe that total spending in 2015–2016 was significantly less
than it would otherwise have been.298 Further, outside spending for the
2018 mid-term elections was 60% greater than such spending for the
2014 mid-terms,299 confirming that the trend is for rapid increases in
outside spending.
Unlimited contributions accounted for almost 90% of receipts of Super
PACs.300
Unlimited contributions also resulted in an unprecedented
concentration of campaign spending by wealthy individuals, accounting
for almost all of the funds raised by independent spending entities.
Almost 90% of contributions to Super PACs (more than $900 million)
was attributable to 511 individuals, or one percent of donors.301
It has been estimated that, combining unlimited contributions to Super
PACs and other independent spending groups and other spending, only
1% of the top 1% (.01%) of adults were responsible for $2.3 billion in
outside money raised during the 2015–2016 election cycle.302

In evaluating these statistics, Buckley 2.0 would first observe that unlimited
contributions to independent spending groups are not themselves direct
independent expenditures made by the donors and, thus, are not entitled to
the same level of constitutional protection as independent expenditures.
Rather, they are contributions, entitled to the protection afforded
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302

See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 111–12, 117, 121–28.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
Sultan, supra note 16 (stating that Trump received free media valued at $5.9 billion in contrast to
Clinton, who received free media valued at less than $2.8 billion).
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87, 89 and accompanying text.
See Sultan, supra note 16 (noting that most of the money went to independent spending groups); see
also Persily et al., supra note 85 (noting the discrepancy between what Super PACs raised in 2016
and what they spent).
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contributions by the original Buckley. The contributions reviewed in Buckley,
of course, were given to candidates and their campaigns, not to groups
deemed independent by the FEC. Given the reasoning set forth in Buckley,
however, this is a distinction without a difference.
When Buckley upheld FECA’s $1000 cap on contributions by individuals
to candidates, it argued that contributions are not entitled to the same degree
of First Amendment protection as expenditures because the burden of a
contribution cap is only a “marginal restriction” on the donor, since
contributions are symbolic speech and the cap leaves individuals free to
participate in elections in other ways, including making independent
expenditures without dollar restrictions.303 Eliminating SpeechNow.org’s
validation of unlimited contributions to groups deemed independent by the
FEC would similarly leave individuals and groups the ability to contribute
up to $5000 to individual PACs, make unlimited independent expenditures
of their own, engage in unlimited issue advocacy relevant to an election, and
participate in the other ways listed by Buckley.304 Buckley 2.0 would thus
conclude that subjecting contributions made to independent spending
entities to dollar limits would not excessively burden the speech rights of
donors to those entities.
However, the original Buckley considered more than the extent of the
burden caused by contribution limits. It upheld those limits because it found
that the government interest in imposing dollar limits to reduce the threat of
corruption was substantial. The unlimited contributions that SpeechNow.org
validated are made to recipients other than candidates and their campaigns,
so Buckley 2.0 would have to examine the threat of corruption in this different
context. It would explore whether unlimited contributions to Super PACs
and certain exempt organizations are less prone to be corrupting than
contributions to candidates because the recipient groups are classified as
“independent” under federal campaign finance law.
Buckley 2.0’s conclusion would rest on a combination of factors. First, it
would note again that the “totally” independent standard of Buckley is not
satisfied in connection with several kinds of outside spending groups because
of the problematic character of the legal standard for independence.305
Further, even if groups are totally independent, the law does not bar those
303
304
305

See supra notes 136–41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. For the greatly increased campaign spending made
possible by McCutcheon, see supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.5.
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who contribute to them from acting in concert with candidates. Buckley 2.0
would note, for example, that the FEC permits candidates themselves to
solicit contributions at fundraising events hosted by spending groups
regarded as independent under FECA as long as the candidates request
contributions of no more than $5000 (the FECA limit for contributions to
candidate PACs), even though the groups themselves can solicit sums of any
size at the same event and advertise the candidate as a guest or featured
speaker.306 Further, no law bars candidates from letting potential donors
know which groups the candidates regard as potentially helpful to their
campaigns, including independent spending groups. Finally, the Buckley 2.0
Court would observe that exempt organizations claiming to be independent
are not required to disclose publicly their donors and the amounts they
donate,307 and even disclosing independent organizations may list donor
entities that do not reveal the sources of their funds.308 In those instances,
there is no transparency, which, according to Buckley can deter corruption.309
Based upon these considerations, Buckley 2.0 would conclude that the risk of
the reality or appearance of corruption from large contributions to
independent spending groups is at least as great as the risk of corruption or
its appearance from contributions made directly to candidates because of the
close association of candidates to Super PACs, the unlimited size of the
contributions, and the public’s inability to identify which individuals or
groups are financially supporting a candidate in many circumstances.
In addition to reviewing the legal standards governing proximity between
candidates and independent spending groups in light of contemporary
campaign practices, Buckley 2.0 would also review the statistics for potentially
unlimited funding of elections since Citizens United. It would observe that the
sums raised have been enormous and that the ability of high-wealth donors
to aggregate their contributions together in Super PACs and other groups
has amplified their impact on elections far beyond what extremely large but
uncoordinated independent expenditures by persons acting singly could
generate.310 Taking into consideration the prevalence of single-candidate
independent expenditure groups, the rate at which such spending is growing,
and the close ties between candidates and legally independent groups, Buckley
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2.0 would conclude that regardless of whether the groups and candidates
coordinate specific strategies and ad buys, the groups have become conduits
enabling individuals to evade the caps on contributions to candidates by
millions of dollars.
Because the sums raised are so great, the threat of corruption is
correspondingly acute. The threat is further magnified by the ability of
independent spending groups funded by unlimited contributions to outspend
candidates in targeted races.311 In evaluating the significance of these
statistics, Buckley 2.0 would observe that post-SpeechNow.org, outside groups are
now in a position to dictate the core of a candidate’s governing agenda by
threatening to withhold support in general elections or back competitors in
primaries. In short, based upon empirical evidence of contemporary
campaign practices and their effects coupled with the Court’s review of the
relevant legal standards, Buckley 2.0 would conclude that the SpeechNow.org
court erred when it held that contributions to independent spending groups
were incapable of coordination and corruption as a matter of law. Buckley
2.0 would, as a consequence, hold that permitting unlimited contributions to
entities classified as independent under campaign finance law was not
constitutionally required.
CONCLUSION
Since Buckley was decided in 1976, the campaign finance framework that
it erected has been eroded by a series of decisions claiming to rest upon its
foundations. During the same period, campaign financing has been
transformed by the skyrocketing cost of campaigns, innovative campaign
practices, rapid increases in the amount of money injected into elections by
business interests, an increasingly small number of high-wealth individuals
accounting for an increasingly large percentage of campaign spending, and
a trend toward employing dark money campaign vehicles and adopting other
strategies to evade campaign finance disclosure rules.
Some of these changes were introduced or accelerated by the decisions
in Citizens United and its progeny, SpeechNow.org. In important respects, each
of these decisions made two important errors: they misrepresented the extent
of their support in precedent and they disregarded empirical campaign
realities in applying doctrines. The Buckley 2.0 thought experiment has
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attempted to identify and shine a spotlight on these errors. The result is a
more faithful reading of the original Buckley and a more honest recognition
of campaign financing realities that threaten the integrity of representative
government in America.

